Legal Innovation in Investment Law: Rhetoric and Practice in Emerging Countries by Rolland, Sonia E. & Trubek, David M.
 
 
355 
LEGAL INNOVATION IN INVESTMENT LAW:  RHETORIC 
AND PRACTICE IN EMERGING COUNTRIES 
 
SONIA E. ROLLAND* & DAVID M. TRUBEK** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
*  Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.  The authors are 
grateful for helpful research assistance from Andrew Manz-Siek.  The authors also 
wish to thank Taylor Daily and the staff of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law for their outstanding work. 
** Voss-Bascom Professor of Law & Dean of International Studies Emeritus, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
356 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction............................................................................ 358 
2. A Discourse of South-South Cooperation ............................ 365 
2.1. Investment for Development, Respect for Sovereignty ........ 366 
2.2. Diplomatic Recourses and Domestic Remedies ................... 371 
 2.2.1. UNASUR: Withdraw from ICSID and Propose a South-
Based Alternative............................................................... 372 
 2.2.2. Brazil: Reject ISDS, Emphasize Investment Facilitation 
and Dispute Avoidance, Rely on Diplomatic Espousal  
 of Claims............................................................................ 374 
 2.2.3. Relying on Domestic Remedies ................................. 377 
3. Seeking a New Balance of Rights and Obligations for  
  Investors ................................................................................. 381 
3.1.  Redefining Investment and Investor .................................. 383 
 3.1.1.  India ....................................................................... 384  
 3.1.2.  China ...................................................................... 387 
 3.1.3.  SADC Model BIT.................................................... 388 
 3.1.4.  Brazil CIFAs ........................................................... 390 
 3.1.5.  South Africa ............................................................ 392 
  3.1.6.  Common Trends ...................................................... 393 
3.2.  Defining and Constraining Investor Protections ............... 395  
 3.2.1.  India ....................................................................... 395  
 3.2.2.  China ...................................................................... 399 
 3.2.3.  SADC ..................................................................... 404 
 3.2.4.  Brazil ...................................................................... 407 
 3.2.5.  South Africa ............................................................ 408 
3.3.  Extending or Creating Carve-Outs and Exceptions ........... 411 
 3.3.1.  India ....................................................................... 412  
 3.3.2.  China ...................................................................... 412 
 3.3.3.  SADC ..................................................................... 415 
 3.3.4.  Brazil ...................................................................... 416 
 3.3.5.  South Africa ............................................................ 417 
3.4.  Investor and Home State Obligations ................................ 418 
 3.4.1.  India ....................................................................... 418  
 3.4.2.  SADC ..................................................................... 420 
 3.4.3.  Brazil ...................................................................... 421 
4. Preserving Domestic Judicial Power and Reforming Investor 
State Arbitration ..................................................................... 422 
4.1.  Limiting Access to Arbitration by Investors ...................... 423 
 4.1.1.  India Model BIT ...................................................... 423  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/2
  
2017] Legal Innovation in Investment Law 357 
 4.1.2.  China ...................................................................... 426 
  4.2.  Moving Away from the pro-Investor Bias ........................ 428 
 4.2.1.  India ....................................................................... 429  
 4.2.2.  SADC ..................................................................... 430 
 4.2.3.  UNASUR ............................................................... 431  
5. Conclusion:  Lessons from Emerging Economies ............... 432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
358 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Until the 1990s, foreign investors seeking protection for their in-
vestments found limited support in international law.  In that dec-
ade, the landscape changed dramatically as capital exporting na-
tions pressed for Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) that protected 
investors against both expropriation and other measures that signif-
icantly impaired the value of their investments.  Today, we are en-
tering yet another era in international investment law. 
Traditional BITs include a system of Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement (ISDS) under which an aggrieved investor may submit a 
claim against the host government directly to an arbitral panel.  
These panels have the power to award damages if the host govern-
ment’s actions are found to have impeded upon protections guaran-
teed by the treaty.  Capital importing countries initially rushed to 
sign BITs.  Amidst significant competition for foreign investment, 
capital importing countries believed that signing BITs would help 
attract much needed foreign cash inflows.  They paid little if any 
attention to the possible risks associated with ISDS.  Over three 
thousands of such agreements were signed creating what some con-
sider to be a de facto global regime. 
After two decades of experience with BITs, developing countries 
began to question the value of many aspects of the regime con-
structed through this web of bilateral agreements.  The benefits from 
BITs are in doubt and their potential social, political and economic 
costs are becoming increasingly apparent.  On the benefit side, some 
have questioned whether signing BITs really increases the flow of 
investment, pointing to Brazil as a counter-narrative narrative.  Alt-
hough it flirted with BITs in the 1990s, Brazil never ratified any 
treaty.  Yet, over the past twenty years, it has been one of the top 
developing country recipients of foreign direct investment.1  At the 
same time, as decisions against host countries by ISDS arbitration 
panels accumulate, and significant damages are awarded, concerns 
                                                   
1  See The World Factbook: Country Comparison, Stock of Direct Foreign In-
vestment, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank.html [https://perma.cc/9ACR-
F33G] (ranking Brazil as the 14th recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) world-
wide based on 2016 estimates of FDI stock.  The only emerging country receiving 
more FDI is China.); see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
World Investment Report 2016, Country Fact Sheet: Brazil, http://unctad.org/sec-
tions/dite_dir/docs/wir2016/wir16_fs_br_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZKM-
2RLS] (comparing Brazil’s FDI flows and stock to other emerging countries).  
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over costs of the treaties for host countries are mounting. Emerging 
countries fear the effects of the BITs regime on their policy making 
capacities, leading them to rethink their commitment to the regime 
that was established in the 1990s. 
Several factors contribute to such a policy move.  To some de-
gree, it is part of a general shift away from unqualified embrace of 
globalization by both governments and industry North and South.2  
But probably the biggest driver has been a reaction to the raft of de-
cisions by arbitrators who have used the often vague language of 
treaties to craft rulings that pose a threat to the regulatory autonomy 
of host countries beyond what signatory states expected when they 
signed onto BITs.  These include use of the concept of “indirect ex-
propriation” to challenge regulatory actions that investors claim sig-
nificantly diminished the value of their investments.  In the so-called 
“indirect expropriation” scenario, the investor claims that, although 
the host state did not engage in an outright expropriation or taking 
of the investment, it took some regulatory measure that had the ef-
fect of significantly diminishing or even entirely wiping out the 
value or the expected value of the investment.  Expropriation claims 
                                                   
2  See The Retreat of the Global Company, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21715653-biggest-business-idea-
past-three-decades-deep-trouble-retreat-global [https://perma.cc/2UHD-N4PS]. 
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in response to regulatory controls3 range from the telecommunica-
tion sector,4 banking and finance,5 public health,6 the environment,7 
                                                   
3  See M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 201 (2015) (“[N]umerous control devises . . . were in-
stances of control that the administrative state increasingly employed.”). 
4  See generally Republic of Ghana v. Telekom Malaysia Berhad, HA/RK 
2004.778, PCA Case Repository 2003-03, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 5 Nov., 2004), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0922.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2EMX-8J6G]. 
5  See generally Rafat Ali Rizvi v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/13, Award on Jurisdiction (July 16, 2013), http://icsid-
files.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1560/DC4512_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R5NL-YBBT]; Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 
2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A3CM-99Y7].  
6  See generally Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and 
Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (July 2, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC3592_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4LVM-8CC7]; Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case 
No 2013/12 (Perm. Ct. Arb. May 20, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents/italaw3207.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQT9-TGXR]; 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Les Laboratoires Servier, 
S.A.A., Biofarma, S.A.S., Arts et Techniques du Progres S.A.S. v. Republic of Po-
land, https://www.italaw.com/cases/1179 [https://perma.cc/RX4Q-HBZX]. 
Pharmaceutical companies have also claimed expropriation or breach of fair and 
equitable treatment against host countries with mature regulatory environment in-
cluding Canada and the United States; see generally Eli Lilly and Co. v. Gov’t of 
Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8546.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KAB6-X5HV] and Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. 
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1 (2012), http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/456 [https://perma.cc/X24W-NFN7].  
7  See generally Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. The Re-
public of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award (Feb. 17, 2000), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C152/DC539_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NL2F-E2U6], 5 ICSID Rep. 157 (2002) (involving a tourist site 
development project by US investors in a biodiversity rich area of Costa Rica. The 
land had been purchased for close to $400,000 and various studies were undertaken 
for a tourist resort development that was never started. Some eight years after the 
original purchase, Costa Rica issued several environmental decrees culminating 
with decrees extending the neighboring nature and wildlife conservation national 
park to include the land under development and expropriated the land with com-
pensation amounting to $1.9 million.).  
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access to water,8 the protection of cultural property,9 the taxation 
power of the host state,10 and socio-economic policies.11  Many cases 
of this type have been brought in recent years and arbitrators 
awarded damages in several instances.  In 2012 India received an 
unfavorable decision in White Industries v. India.  This decision, 
which was based on delays in the Indian judiciary, caused a major 
stir in India.  In its wake, India faced seventeen further notices of 
arbitrations.12  Even when the claim is dismissed, litigation is costly 
for the host country.  Concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and 
                                                   
8  See generally Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tan-
zania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (24 July, 2008); Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. 
Republic Of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objec-
tions to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C67/DC1589_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MMB-Y8CC]; Damon Vis-Dunbar & Luke Eric Peterson, Boliv-
ian Water Dispute Settled, Bechtel Forgoes Compensation, INV. TREATY NEWS (Jan. 20, 
2006), http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/up-
loads/2010/10/itn_jan20_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC54-LWDA]. 
9  See generally Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v. The Government 
of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award of Jurisdiction (May 17, 2007), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C247/DC654_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WM73-7NV6]; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith-
uania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award (Sept. 11, 2007), http://icsid-
files.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C252/DC682_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EK7F-V4BD]; VALENTINA VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2014).  
10  See generally Señor Tza Yap Shum v. La Republica del Perú, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/6, Laudo (Sept. 11, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents/ita0881.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6JD-TWSK]. 
11  See generally Piero Foresti et al. v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/1, Award (Aug. 4, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C90/DC1651_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV95-
2K33]; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005), 44 ILM 1205 (2005); Enron Corporation and 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, De-
cision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) (Aug. 2, 2004), http://icsid-
files.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3/DC502_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PGQ6-FXD3]; Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Re-
public, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007), http://icsid-
files.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C8/DC694_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W9HY-U7UN].  
12  Grant Hanessian & Kabir Duggal, The 2015 India Model BIT: Is This the 
Change the World Wishes to See?, 30 ICSID  REV. 729 (2015) (“In 2012, however, India 
received an unfavourable decision in White Industries v India . . . Shortly after it was 
decided, India received another 17 notices of dispute over claims ranging from the 
cancellation of licenses to the review of Supreme Court decisions.”). 
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“full protection and security” also received expansive readings.  Ad-
ditionally, a number of arbitrations not involving emerging coun-
tries sent legal and political signals that increased the angst of de-
veloping host states.  This is particularly true with respect to 
arbitrations that expanded the reach of dispute settlement clauses 
included in BITs and restricting the scope of safeguards created to 
protect the domestic jurisdiction of the host state13 involved a claim 
by an Argentine national against Spain, where the investor had not 
fulfilled the waiting period in the jurisdictional clause of the Argen-
tine–Spain BIT.14  The tribunal agreed with him that a jurisdictional 
clause of the Chile–Spain BIT,15 which did not have such a waiting 
period, could be applied instead because it was a more favorable 
clause which could be imported thanks to the Argentine-Spain BIT’s 
most favored nation (MFN) clause.16  More recently, RosInvestCo17 
went even further by using an MFN clause to broaden the types of 
claims that could be brought under a BIT when another BIT signed 
by the host state included coverage for a wider range of claims.18 
Although ISDS defenders are quick to point out that investors 
lost a number of these claims,19 developing countries remain con-
                                                   
13  See generally Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (Nov. 13, 2000), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C163/DC566_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SCD6-6WH6], 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002). 
14  For details about the Argentina-Spain BIT, see generally Agreement be-
tween the Argentine Republic and Kingdom of Spain on the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments, Arg.–Spain, Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.TS 202.  
15  See generally Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Re-
public of Chile on the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments, Chile-
Spain, Oct. 2, 1991, 1774 U.N.T.S 25. 
16  Id. at art 4.2.  
17  See generally RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, Arbitra-
tion Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Comerce Case No. V079/2005, Final 
Award (Sept. 12, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu-
ments/ita0719.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT2P-2KY3]. 
18  See id (adjudicating argument for jurisdiction based on the MFN 
clauses in Article 3 of the UK-Soviet BIT in connection with the Denmark-Russia 
BIT). 
19  See, e.g., Plama v. Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Ju-
risdiction, (Feb. 8, 2005), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C24/DC521_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PVE-
FYFD], 20 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 262 (2005) (finding that investors misrepresented their 
identy and qualifications, which was material to the investment authorization); 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Inte-
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cerned about the chilling effect that the specter of arbitration im-
poses on their policy autonomy, the resources involved in defending 
arbitrations against well-endowed investors, and the unstable cli-
mate created by uncertainty and at times inconsistency in decisions 
regarding awards. 
Arbitration awards are only binding on the parties thereto; arbi-
trators regularly come down with conflicting awards and a number 
of awards remain confidential.  Nonetheless, the body of publically 
available awards forms a reservoir of arguments and analyses that 
arbitrators and negotiators draw from and may use.  As a result, 
even though investor–state arbitration awards are technically de-
void of stare decisis effect, they do have a role in shaping interna-
tional investment law beyond the individual case at hand.20 
The nature of resistance to the traditional BITs regime varies.  
Some states are withdrawing from existing agreements21 or related 
                                                   
grales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentice Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Deci-
sion on Liability, ¶¶ 151, 217-218, https://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents/ita0813.pdf [https://perma.cc/E566-JZKW] (finding 
no expropriation but deciding that the state had breached its obligations regarding 
fair and equitable treatment by refusing to renegotiate the tariff rates for water); 
LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International Inc.  v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 248 (Oct. 3, 2006), 
21 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 203 (2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents/ita0460.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BSF-XBJU] (rejecting 
the claims that the Respondent had directly or indirectly expropriated Claimants’ 
investments and denied the Claimants’ investments full protection and security).  
20  See, e.g., Renta 4 S.V.S.A, Ahorro Corporación Emergentes F.I., Ahorro 
Corporación Eurofondo F.I., Rovime Inversiones SICAV S.A., Quasar de Valors 
SICAV S.A., Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., GBI 9000 SICAV S.A. v. The Russian 
Federation, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award 
on Preliminary Objections, ¶ 16 (Mar. 20, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/docu-
ments/Renta.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX8M-LNAT] (“The arbitrators do not in any 
event operate in a hierarchical and unitary system which requires them to follow 
precedents. They are nevertheless attentive to prior decisions brought to their at-
tention. They are bound to do so as part of their basic duty to consider the Parties’ 
arguments.”). See generally Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International 
Investment Law: Emergence of a Multilateral System of Investment Protection on Bilateral 
Grounds, 2(1) TRADE L. & DEV. 59 (2010); STEPHAN SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2009). 
21  Indonesia and South Africa’s policy is to notify partners of its intent 
not to renew BITs that reach the ten or fifteen-year period for initial validity.  The 
first South African treaties to lapse under this type of sunset clause were the BITs 
with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (2012), with Switzerland (2013), 
with the Netherlands (2013), with Spain (2013), with Germany (2014), with Austria 
(2014), with France (2014) and with Denmark (2014). South Africa also plans to re-
consider its BIT with China when the initial ten-year validity period comes to term 
(in 2018).  Indonesia has terminated BITs with Norway (2001), Egypt (2014), Bul-
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systems such as the World Bank’s International Center for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), others call for changes in 
the scope of new BITs, and yet others promote radical alternatives.  
For instance, South Africa enacted a Protection of Investment Act in 
2015, which seeks to replace bilateral treaties with domestic legisla-
tion stipulating the rights and obligations of the government and of 
all investors, both local and foreign.22  Brazil, which has traditionally 
relied on domestic law to manage foreign investment, has now 
adopted a new form of bilateral treaty called Cooperation and In-
vestment Facilitation Agreements (CIFAs) which defines invest-
ment more narrowly than traditional BITs, limits the scope of pro-
tection, stresses investment facilitation and dispute avoidance, and 
eschews ISDS.  In 2012, Indonesia undertook a review of its interna-
tional investment agreements in reaction to high profile arbitration 
claims in the banking and mining sectors.  Meanwhile, India and 
others have released new model BITs which depart from the tradi-
tional framework quite significantly.  China, after evolving through 
several model BITs, now proceeds largely on an ad hoc basis. 
Additionally, governments from emerging countries and civil 
society alike question a system in which claims against states are 
handled by arbitrators in the North who have wide discretion to in-
terpret general clauses in ways that can severely limit host states’ 
regulatory competence.  But, here again, emerging countries re-
spond to the problem in different ways.  Some accept the basic ele-
ments of the existing structure, including traditional investor-state 
arbitration, embrace strict protection for their outward investment, 
but wish to preserve policy space domestically.  Some seek to 
change the scope of coverage for both parties, carve out exceptions 
to preserve policy space, and add measures to better ensure that ar-
bitrators are not biased.  Others accept the idea of international ar-
bitration of investor-state claims, but want to create a new institu-
tional structure based in and controlled by developing countries.  
More radically, some refuse to participate in the ISDS system alto-
gether while offering a very different approach to foreign invest-
ments emphasizing facilitation over protection. 
                                                   
garia (2015), China (2015), France (2015), Italy (2015), Lao People’s Democratic Re-
public (2015), Malaysia (2015), Netherlands (2015), Slovakia (2015), Cambodia 
(2016), Romania (2016), Turkey (2016) and Vietnam (2016).  Additionally, the Indo-
nesia-Argentina BIT was terminated by mutual agreement. 
22  See generally Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 (S. Afr.).  
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These trends influence the overall debate about BITs, particu-
larly when they intersect with critiques from the United States, the 
European Union (EU) and other traditionally outward investment 
zones.  While emerging economies have been the most vocal critics, 
some in capital-exporting countries also question the agreements 
now that they find themselves on the receiving end of investment, 
playing the role of host state.  As emerging economies become cap-
ital exporters, developed countries face challenges to their own reg-
ulatory autonomy and are coming under pressure from multina-
tional corporations.  For example, in the debates over the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP), strong voices in the United States and Eu-
rope spoke out against the use of ISDS.  With opposition to the BITs 
regime developing in both the North and the South, it may be that a 
broader global shift is underway that could lead to new standards 
of foreign investment regulation. 
This article first explores the discourse of South-South coopera-
tion as a driver for revisiting investment regulation (Part I) and in-
vestigates how that actually translates into legal instruments that 
shift the balance of investor and host-states’ rights and obligations 
(Part II).  Part III analyzes legal positions and proposals from the 
global South for investor-state dispute settlement and Part IV looks 
at prospects for the investment regime in light of resistance in the 
South, critiques from the North, and the US withdrawal from TPP 
and TTIP negotiations. 
 
2.  A DISCOURSE OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 
 
Some developing countries have heralded the need for South-
South investment relationships that are cooperative, compared to 
what they perceive as the unbalanced, investor-controlled frame-
work arising out of traditional BITs.  Some have even decried tradi-
tional BITs as a tool of post-colonial anti-communist policies.23  
China’s first major foray into foreign investment in the 1990s was 
often characterized by a rhetoric of cooperation and mutual assis-
                                                   
23  See, e.g., Mohammad Mossallam, Process Matters: South Africa’s Experi-
ence Exiting its BITs, THE GLOBAL ECON. GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME (Jan. 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2562417 [https://perma.cc/EX3H-VRFD] (arguing that 
the majority of BITs reflect texts developed to promote anti-communist, post-decol-
onisation protection agendas of the 1960s). 
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tance.  Brazil’s new Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agree-
ments (CIFAs) are also firmly anchored in a discourse of South-
South cooperation.  However, whether the discourse of cooperation 
and developmental solidarity actually finds application in legal in-
struments calls for a nuanced answer.  In practice, China blurred the 
boundaries between aid and development financing, on the one 
hand, and foreign direct investment (FDI), on the other hand, in new 
ways that are now becoming entrenched in the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and perhaps the BRICS Bank.  Brazil’s CIFAs, by 
contrast, reflect a return to a more diplomacy-led approach to for-
eign investment relations. 
 
2.1.  Investment for Development, Respect for Sovereignty 
 
Overall, emerging economies are seeking to differentiate them-
selves from traditional BITs policies in the framing of foreign invest-
ment.  Some treaties emphasize investment as a vector for develop-
ment, understood in a more holistic way than simply a matter of 
increasing gross domestic product or other aggregate economic 
benchmarks.  In that sense, investment is seen as embedded in social 
and economic development policies, rather than strictly in the busi-
ness and finance environment.  Additionally or alternatively, some 
countries prioritize, at least in the discourse, mutual respect for sov-
ereignty and non-interference in domestic policy choices of the par-
ties. 
The Preamble to the South African Development Community 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (“SADC Model BIT”) released in 
July 2012 provides an illustration:  “Recognizing the important con-
tribution investment can make to the sustainable development of 
the State Parties, including the reduction of poverty, increase of pro-
ductive capacity, economic growth, the transfer of technology, and 
the furtherance of human rights and human development . . . Reaf-
firming the right of the State Parties to regulate and to introduce new 
measures relating to investments in their territories in order to meet 
national policy objectives, and—taking into account any asymme-
tries with respect to the measures in place—the particular need of 
developing countries to exercise this right . . .”24  This approach is 
                                                   
24  See S. AFR. DEV. CMTY., SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Tem-
plate with Commentary art. 20–22, July 2012, http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2012/10/SADC-ModelBIT-Template-Final.pdf 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/2
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also reaffirmed in the operative, numbered provisions of the treaty 
such as Article 1:  “The main objective of this Agreement is to en-
courage and increase investments [between investors of one State 
Party into the territory of the other State Party] that support the sus-
tainable development of each Party, and in particular the Host State 
where an investment is to be located.”25  Also in Africa, the guiding 
principles for the Pan African Investment Code (PAIC) currently be-
ing negotiated under the auspices of the African Union include:  “(i) 
suit the national policies in order to scale up and maintain the Do-
mestic Investment; (ii) create conducive business environment for 
sustainable growth; (iii) promote African integration process; (iv) 
ensure that the PAIC tackles the issue of Social Corporate and Envi-
ronmental responsibility; and (v) attract FDI as one of the vehicles 
to sustain the development.”26 
The changes in the framing of the India Model BIT over time re-
veal underlying policy motivations.  The Preamble of the 2003 
Model BIT was very much in line with traditional BITs.  It stated: 
[d]esiring to create conditions favourable for fostering 
greater investment by investors of one State in the territory 
of the other State; [r]ecognising that the encouragement and 
reciprocal protection under International agreement of such 
investment will be conducive to the stimulation of individ-
ual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both 
States . . .27 
By contrast, the Draft 2015 Model BIT emphasized sovereignty 
and development: 
[d]esiring to promote bilateral cooperation between the Par-
ties with respect to foreign investments; and [r]eaffirming 
the right of Parties to regulate Investments in their territory 
in accordance with their Law and policy objectives including 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/NV4E-M6P2]. 
25  See id. at art. 1. 
26  See Third Conference of African Ministers in charge of Integration 
(COMAI III) held in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, on 22-23 May 2008, excerpted in Press 
Release, Pan-African Investment Code: African Independent Legal Experts kicks 
off in Djibouti, PRESS RELEASE Nº 292/2014, (Oct. 30, 2014) (on file with author) 
(describing the gathering of experts to “discuss and review the Pan African Invest-
ment Code”). 
27  Indian Model Text of BIPA, http://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/archive/ita1026.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2YK-3Z95].  
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the right to change the conditions applicable to such Invest-
ments; and [s]eeking to align the objectives of Investment 
with sustainable development and inclusive growth of the 
Parties . . .28 
The final 2016 Model BIT scales back on some of this language 
and adds the protection of investments as a core feature on par with 
investment promotion: 
[r]ecognizing that the promotion and the protection of in-
vestments of investors of one Party in the territory of the 
other Party will be conducive to the stimulation of mutually 
beneficial business activity, to the development of economic 
cooperation between them and to the promotion of sustain-
able development, [r]eaffirming the right of Parties to regu-
late investments in their territory in accordance with their 
law and policy objectives.29 
A clause in the Draft Model BIT to safe-harbor “the rights of ei-
ther Party to formulate, modify, amend, apply or revoke its Law in 
good faith,” “[e]ach Party retains the right to exercise discretion with 
respect to regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and prosecutorial 
matters, including discretion regarding allocation of resources and 
establishment of penalties,” was dropped in the final version.  The 
evolution echoes economic and political developments since the 
2003 Model BIT, as India has continued to liberalize conditions of 
establishment and ownership for foreign investors.  The Modi ad-
ministration, emanating from the more conservative Bharatiya Ja-
nata Party that came into power in 2014, has aggressively positioned 
itself as business-oriented. 
While Chinese BITs drafted in the 1980s merely included a brief 
reference to “principles of equality and mutual benefit” in their pre-
ambles and emphasized the business relationship between the host 
and home countries,30 the following decade inaugurated a shift.  The 
                                                   
28  Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
http://www.jurisafrica.org/html/pdf_indian-bilateral-investment-treaty.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5TMG-VK37] [hereinafter Indian Draft Model BIT]. 
29  Preamble, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of 
Economic Affairs, Office memorandum, F. No. 26/5/2013-IC, Annex, Dec. 28, 2015 
[hereinafter 2016 Indian Model BIT].   
30  See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic So-
cialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Sri Lanka, Mar. 
13, 1986, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/781 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/2
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China-Bolivia BIT signed in 1992 provides an illustration.  Its Pre-
amble notes that the Parties enter into the agreement 
[d]esiring to encourage, protect and create favorable condi-
tions for investment by investors of one Contracting State in 
the territory of the other Contracting State based on the prin-
ciples of mutual respect for sovereignty, equality and mutual 
benefit and for the purpose of the development of economic 
cooperation between both States.31 
Variants of this language appear in the 1990 China-Pakistan BIT, 
the 1989 China-Ghana BIT, the 1991 China-Mongolia BIT, the 1992 
China-Philippines BIT and others ratified at various points during 
the decade.32  However, not all Chinese BITs reflect the shift in lan-
guage.  Some of the 1990s BITs use the preambular language of the 
1980s focused on business relations.33 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/6UCR-FCUC] (indicating that the parties desire “to create fa-
vourable conditions for greater economic co-operation between them and in partic-
ular for investments by nationals and companies of one State in the territory of the 
other State based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit” and recognize 
“that reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of such investments will 
be conducive to stimulating business initiative and increasing prosperity in both 
states . . . .”). 
31  Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Reprblic [sic] of 
China and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia Concerning the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Bol.-China, May 8, 1992, http://in-
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/449 
[https://perma.cc/2DQE-9VPH]. 
32  Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encour-
agement and the Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Dec. 2, 1989, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/766 [https://perma.cc/KS83-
N82P]; Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Government of the Republic of Ghana Concerning the Encouragement and the 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, China-Ghana, Dec. 2, 1989, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/737 [https://perma.cc/24HE-
E7HJ]; Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Government of the Mongolian People’s Republic Concerning the Encourage-
ment and the Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Aug. 8,1991, http://investment-
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/760 [https://perma.cc/LYH8-
Z5TV]; Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning the Encouragement 
and the Reciprocal Protection of Investment, July 20, 1992, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/769 [https://perma.cc/HJH7-5VLV]. 
33  See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Chile 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encourage-
ment and the Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Chile-China, May 23, 1994, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/664 
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Brazil’s CIFAs also reflect this new trend of framing South-South 
investment relations as more development-oriented and more 
mindful of each partner’s sovereign policy choices than the tradi-
tional BITs framework.  Since 2015, Brazil has signed CIFAs with 
Angola, Chile, Colombia, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique and Peru 
and has conducted negotiations with South Africa, Algeria, India, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Thailand, and Tunisia.34  For example, the Acordo 
de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos entre o Governo da 
República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República de 
Moçambique (hereinafter “Mozambique CIFA”) preamble affirms 
the development grounding and sovereign autonomy spirit of the 
agreement:  “Recognizing the essential role of investment in pro-
moting sustainable development, economic growth, poverty reduc-
tion, job creation, expansion of productive capacity and human de-
velopment; . . . [r]eaffirming its legislative autonomy and space for 
public policies,” followed by Article 1 stating, “This Agreement 
aims at the cooperation between the Parties to facilitate and promote 
mutual investment.”35  The recently signed agreement with Mexico, 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/4WP2-3PM4]; Agreement Between the Government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Georgia Concerning 
the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection of Investment, China-Geor., June 
3, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/735 
[https://perma.cc/EJ4M-4AZR]; Agreement Between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Republic of Turkey Concerning the Encouragement and the Recip-
rocal Protection of Investment, China-Turk., Nov. 13, 1990, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/789 [https://perma.cc/C7VE-EA54]; 
Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement 
and the Reciprocal Protection of Investment, China-Uru., Dec. 2, 1993, http://in-
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/794 
[https://perma.cc/AR8F-QNTH] (all of the above detailing efforts improve the fi-
nancial wellbeing of both countries through “economic cooperation”). 
34  Brazil: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27 [https://perma.cc/6FZE-RR36] (identify-
ing the countries with which Brazil has signed Cooperation and Investment Facili-
tation Agreements (CIFAs)). 
35  Acordo de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos entre o Governo 
da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República de Moçambique, Braz.-
Mozam., Mar. 30, 2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Down-
load/TreatyFile/4717 [https://perma.cc/RPN3-YBSA] [hereinafter Mozambique 
CIFA]; Acuerdo de Cooperacion y de Facilitación de las Inversiones entre la 
República Federativa del Brasil y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Braz.-Mex., May 
26, 2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4718 
[https://perma.cc/BS88-G57P], authors’ translation outlining the CIFA between 
Brazil and Mexico). 
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Acuerdo de Cooperacion y de Facilitación de las Inversiones entre 
la República Federativa del Brasil y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
(hereinafter “Mexico CIFA”), has identical language. 
For China and Brazil , the South-South cooperation approach 
goes beyond investment treaties and involves a multi-faceted strat-
egy ranging from overseas development assistance to investment 
through development finance, infrastructure building, subsidized 
loans, technical cooperation, and scholarship and cultural ex-
changes.36 
 
2.2.  Diplomatic Recourses and Domestic Remedies 
 
Beyond the policy discourse underpinning an increasing num-
ber of BITs from emerging countries, certain features of the agree-
ments also seek to move away from traditional investor-led, adver-
sarial dispute settlement processes.  Part III below explores the 
range of reforms and technical fixes to the traditional framework 
that have been proposed in some recent model BITs, but it is note-
worthy that some emerging countries seek to by-pass investor-state 
arbitration altogether.  Adverse arbitration decisions, or even the 
mere fact of having to defend arbitration claims, has led a number 
of major developing countries to reconsider investor state arbitra-
tion, to pull out of BITs including such recourse, or to withdraw 
from investor-state arbitration fora such as ICSID. 
For instance, South Africa has been in the process of terminating 
BITs since 2013, either by letting treaties lapse per their sunset 
clauses or by treaty denunciation.  A number of prominent host 
countries are not parties to the ICSID Convention (including Brazil, 
India, South Africa, Mexico and Venezuela).  As with the framing of 
investment agreements, two trends seem to dominate, either con-
currently or separately: the quest for a process that allows more 
space for developmental policies and the concern for perceived loss 
of sovereign autonomy.  The first is illustrated by initiatives in the 
                                                   
36  For Brazil, see, e.g., Paolo de Renzio, Geovana Zoccal Gomes, João 
Moura E. M. da Fonseca & Amir Niv, Brazil and South-South Cooperation: How to 
Respond to Current Challenges (BRICS Pol’y Ctr. Centro de Estudos e Pesquisas, BPC 
Policy Brief V. 3 N. 55, May 2013), http://bricspolicycenter.org/homolog/up-
loads/trabalhos/6780/doc/1583232112.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTF7-EFNK] (de-
scribing Brazil’s role in South-South development cooperation and the agencies 
that work in conjunction with the Brazilian agency for development cooperation).  
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Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) context (Section 1).  
The second is reflected by the return to diplomatic processes insti-
tutionalized in Brazil’s CIFAs (Section 2) or reliance on domestic ju-
dicial and administrative remedies as the sole avenue for resolving 
foreign investor grievances (Section 3). 
 
2.2.1.  UNASUR:  Withdraw from ICSID and Propose a South-
Based Alternative 
 
Over the past two decades, over a third of ISDS arbitrations have 
involved Latin American host states.  Although Argentina accounts 
for the bulk of these cases, Venezuela, Mexico and Ecuador have also 
seen their measures, often considered a matter of public policy, chal-
lenged in ICSID arbitrations.  The result has been an attack on ICSID 
and BITs by some Latin American countries, withdrawal from the 
system by several, and proposals to create a regional arbitration sys-
tem as an alternative. 
For at least some countries in the region, the attack on BITs and 
ICSID includes ideological as well as practical issues and is embed-
ded in a broader effort to create an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist 
bloc.  At the core of this initiative is ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance 
for the Peoples of Our America and ALBA-TCP, ALBA’s proposed 
Trade Agreement for the People.  Started by Cuba and Venezuela, 
the Alliance has been joined by Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, Ec-
uador, and several Caribbean Islands. ALBA seeks to create an in-
dependent socialist economic space in Latin America.  Among other 
initiatives, ALBA has launched an attack on BITs, claiming that they 
are tools of capitalist imperialism.  The 2013 Summit Declaration tes-
tifies to this perspective: 
. . . we are currently witnessing the emergence of new forms 
of exploitation, by means of the imposition of tools such as 
bilateral investment protection and the functioning of inter-
national institutions such as ICSID arbitration, which put the 
interests of capital the interests of society, nature, and the 
very democratic institutions in the context of the prolifera-
tion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). It is . . . these new 
mechanisms [of] domination that threatens the stability of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/2
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our countries.”37 
Several ALBA members have sought to withdraw from ICSID, 
citing serious flaws in the regime.  Bolivia took the lead.  In 2006, the 
Morales government nationalized the hydrocarbon industry. 
Shortly thereafter, Bolivia formally denounced the ICSID Conven-
tion.  Bolivia’s stated reasons were that the regime is biased in favor 
of investors, uses an unclear and arbitrary methodology, is closed 
and non-transparent, is very costly, lacks an appeals system, does 
not allow states to file claims against companies and the Convention 
violates the Bolivian Constitution.38  Bolivia also announced that it 
would seek to renegotiate existing BITs.  Although the Venezuelan 
National Assembly recommended withdrawal from ICSID in 2008, 
the government has yet to notify ICSID of its withdrawal.  Addition-
ally, Venezuela has sought to withdraw from some BITs.  Ecuador 
was keen to eliminate ICSID jurisdiction in disputes relating to nat-
ural resource investments, including oil, gas and minerals.  Ulti-
mately, it formally notified ICSID of its denunciation of the Conven-
tion, effective January 7, 2010. Nicaragua considered denouncing 
the Convention but later announced that it would no longer enter 
into investment agreements providing for ICSID as a competent tri-
bunal. 
These and other concerns about ICSID have led Latin American 
nations to explore the idea of a regional arbitration center run by 
Latin Americans, for Latin Americans.  Although the initiative came 
from Ecuador, a core ALBA member, this idea has been adopted by 
UNASUR, a broader organization that includes all nations in South 
America.  A draft proposal includes a number of provisions reflect-
ing developing country concerns, particularly protections for policy 
space, requirements for exhaustion of remedies and preservation of 
the authority of domestic tribunals, measures to avoid arbitrator 
bias, an exclusivity requirement limiting forum shopping, rules for 
participation by non-parties, transparency, and an appeals system 
                                                   
37  Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, Declaration 
from the Pacific XII ALBA-TCP Presidential and Government Summit, July 30, 
2013, http://cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/declaracion-alba-
guayaquil-julio-2013-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECL3-KH33]. 
38  See Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries 
to Replace ICSID Arbitration, 2 BEIJING L. REV. 134, 137-38 (2011) (highlighting the 
critical perspective held by Latin Americans towards the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and efforts seeking to replace ICSID ar-
bitration). 
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with a system of precedents.39  This proposal has been under discus-
sion for a number of years and it is not clear whether and when it 
might be implemented.  However, even if it never materializes in 
the form outlined, the UNASUR proposal is a clear reflection of the 
resistance of developing countries to the classic 1990s BITs regime 
and constitutes a source of ideas for any reform that may emerge. 
Although ALBA’s campaign against ICSID and several coun-
tries’ withdrawal from the Convention are influenced by ideological 
trends and form part of a larger geo-political project,40 there is a 
practical element shared by other developing countries which do 
not necessarily agree with ALBA’s ideological position.  Fiezzoni 
summarizes the Latin American concerns:  linkage to the World 
Bank may affect countries’ credit rating if they challenge ICSID; pol-
icy space is too restricted and national interest in protecting health 
and the environment are not taken into account; there is a total lack 
of transparency; arbitrators show bias in favor of investors; deci-
sions are inconsistent and unpredictable (different tribunals have 
looked at similar facts and reached different conclusions); there is 
no appeal; arbitrators give no consideration to a government’s need 
to deal with economic crises; and the cost of defending claims is pro-
hibitive.41 
 
2.2.2.  Brazil: Reject ISDS, Emphasize Investment Facilitation and 
Dispute Avoidance, Rely on Diplomatic Espousal of Claims 
 
Unlike traditional BIT procedures, the new Brazil agreements 
envision a state-to-state dispute settlement process that is similar to 
traditional diplomatic protection whereby a private entity ag-
grieved by a foreign state must call upon the state of its nationality 
to seek redress on its behalf from the foreign state.  Such a move 
bucks the trend of judicialization of foreign investment law and the 
concomitant growing role of private entities (natural persons or le-
                                                   
39  Id. 
40  Larry Catã Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of Al-
ternative Global Trade Systems: Alba and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
679, 679 (2014) (examining the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America 
(ALBA) as a system of free trade, including the relevant ideology and institutional-
ization associated with it). 
41  Fiezzoni, supra note 38, at 134. 
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gal persons) in international law over the past century.  It is there-
fore quite a radical response to emerging countries’ demand for the 
protection of their “policy space” against norms of international eco-
nomic law perceived to be at times incompatible with their develop-
ment models.42  This section takes the Brazil-Mozambique CIFA as 
an illustrative model; agreements with Brazil’s other partners are es-
sentially similar. 
The Agreement establishes a Joint Committee composed of gov-
ernment representatives appointed by each State.  The Committee is 
expected to meet at least once annually, under alternating presi-
dency to discuss implementation, work towards deeper coordina-
tion and cooperation, and help to resolve disputes.43 Moreover, an 
Annex that forms integral part of the Agreement lists priority topics 
of cooperation for the Joint Committee.44  Alongside the Committee, 
the States are each to designate a domestic “Focal Point,” which is a 
specific government agency tasked with offering support to inves-
tors of the other State.  The Focal Points implement the Joint Com-
mittee’s guidelines and liaise with other governmental authorities 
domestically and with its counterpart in the other State.45 
Brazilian CIFAs do not include investor-state arbitration.  In-
stead, they rely on the Focal Point agencies (also called “Ombuds-
man”), backed by the Joint Committee, to assist in the conciliatory 
settlement of disputes.46  Despite the use of the term “Ombudsman,” 
then, this process does not designate a neutral independent person 
to help resolve disputes.47 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the “Ombudsman” model was 
                                                   
42  In the Brazil-Mozambique and (Brazil-)Angola contexts, this issue 
may be less salient because of the history of trade and investment relations between 
the two countries. Additionally, Brazilian investors may not be concerned about 
over-reach by these African states as they appear to be comfortable with this new 
approach to investment protection. Whether such a model would operate equally 
well in other circumstances remains an open question. 
43  Mozambique CIFA, supra note 35 at art. 4.  
44  Id., annex.  
45  Other features of the CIFAs include provisions for engagement of the 
private sector and civil society and Corporate Social Responsibility. For example, 
the Brazil-Mozambique CIFA creates opportunities for including the private sector 
at large (beyond the protected investors) and civil society at the policy coordination 
level, at the implementation stage, and in dispute resolution efforts and the main 
text of the treaty and a detailed annex spell out principles for corporate social re-
sponsibility of investors. Although not worded as a strict obligation, its inclusion 
in the treaty is remarkable because it is atypical.  
46  Mozambique CIFA, supra note 35 at art. 15. 
47  Id.  
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initially inspired by the Korean institution of a Foreign Investment 
Ombudsman, established in 1999, and which has enjoyed a vast suc-
cess in resolving disputes outside of formal judicial or arbitral pro-
ceedings.  The office of the Ombudsman was created as a one-stop 
service to handle grievances by foreign investors in Korea.  The of-
fice of the Ombudsman’s focus is on post-investment services for 
foreign investors in areas covering finance, taxation, accounting, in-
tellectual property rights, construction and labor.  The Ombudsman 
is the head of the grievance settlement body.  Grievances are re-
solved through the Home Doctor System by the direct deployment 
of licensed and experienced experts to business sites and indirectly 
by taking pre-emptive measures to prevent future grievances 
through systemic improvements and legal amendments.  The Om-
budsman is commissioned by the President on a recommendation 
of the Minister of Trade, Industry & Energy, through the delibera-
tion of the Foreign Investment Committee. 
Since 2010 the Ombudsman has been the Chair of the Korea’s 
Regulatory Reform Committee and also sits on the Presidential 
Council on National Competitiveness (PCNC), thus ensuring that 
the opinions of foreign investors are heard at the highest levels of 
policy-making within Korea.  Since 2010, the Ombudsman has been 
empowered to directly contact heads of ministries and government 
agencies for requests and recommendations.  Through its member-
ship in the PCNC, the Ombudsman is able to address investor griev-
ance issues directly to various ministers and heads of relevant gov-
ernment authorities in the presence of the President at monthly 
meetings of the PCNC. 
The Brazilian Ombudsman/Focal Point system, however, dif-
fers substantially from the Korean model.  The role is not embodied 
by a person, but rather is envisioned as a committee with intermin-
isterial representation.  While the agreements establish a process to 
encourage settlement of disputes, only the governments may trigger 
these procedures.48  In the Mozambique agreement, a dispute must 
be officially initiated by the State Party of the investor by filing a 
request to the Joint Committee.49  The latter then has 60 days, renew-
able by mutual agreement, to present relevant information and to 
invite representatives of the investor, as well as of governmental and 
                                                   
48  Id. 
49  Id.  
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non-governmental entities involved in the dispute.  Following meet-
ings as necessary to resolve the situation, the procedure may be 
closed by request of either State Party.  If the dispute has not been 
resolved, the State Parties may then proceed to arbitration. Joint 
Committee actions and documents remain mostly confidential. 
The early CIFAs did not provide any details concerning the na-
ture of arbitration, other than to make clear that it was limited to 
State-to-State disputes. Subsequent agreements signed with Latin 
American countries have added substantial detail, although the 
agreements are rather varied.  Thus the Mexico and Colombia agree-
ments specify that the arbitral tribunal for State-to-State disputes 
may determine damages and award compensation,50 while others 
are silent.  All provide a general framework for arbitration covering 
the number of arbitrators, use of WTO rules on conduct of arbitra-
tors, and time limits for the arbitral proceedings.  However, they 
vary in the procedures for the arbitration and other aspects. 
 
2.2.3.  Relying on Domestic Remedies 
 
A number of BITs have historically included a “fork in the road” 
provision allowing the investor to pursue either domestic judicial 
remedies or international arbitration. Additionally, a number of in-
vestor-state disputes that ultimately resulted in arbitration involved 
some domestic proceedings, often initiated by the state, such as tax 
recovery law suits, appeals regarding licenses, permits, land rights 
or use, etc. Affected third parties, such as environmental or social 
groups, local communities, or competitors, might also bring suits 
against foreign investors and since they are not bound by any treaty-
based or contractual arbitration clause, they typically elect a domes-
tic forum that is either logistically convenient or strategically useful. 
Even in the aftermath of an investor-state arbitration, a victorious 
investor may find itself pursuing domestic remedies to obtain recog-
nition and enforcement of the arbitration award against specific as-
sets. Therefore, despite the frequent use of BIT-based investor-state 
arbitration clauses, there are a number of circumstances when for-
eign investors will find themselves embroiled in domestic litigation 
                                                   
50  See Acordo de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos Entre a Re-
pública Federativa Do Brasil e a República da Colômbia, Braz.-Colom., arts. 19.2, 
23, Oct. 10, 2015 [https://perma.cc/EN73-86EX] (hereinafter “Colombia CIFA”) 
(providing examples of early CIFAs). 
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in the host state, home state or even elsewhere. 
Some developing host states have implemented an even stricter 
approach in favor of domestic remedies by excluding investor-state 
arbitration altogether.  Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia are the 
most prominent examples.  With the exception of the new CIFA-
based diplomatic recourse discussed above, Brazil only offers do-
mestic judicial and administrative remedies to investors in disputes 
with the state.  Inasmuch as they are withdrawing from BITs, South 
Africa and Indonesia are mostly reverting to domestic remedies, 
with some important caveats discussed below.  The 2015 South Af-
rican Protection of Investment Act specifically excludes investor-
state arbitration and South Africa is considering new BITs without 
an investor-state arbitration clause, particularly with countries 
where it is exporting.  Indonesia has also denounced a slew of BITs 
and is drafting a new model BIT though it is unclear whether it plans 
to exclude investor-state arbitration from its new approach. 
With respect to South Africa and Indonesia, a number of claims 
may nevertheless survive the termination of BITs and still be eligible 
for investor-state arbitration.  Indeed, survival clauses in some of the 
lapsed BITs may continue to protect existing investments for a num-
ber of years after the treaty has been terminated, though the period 
varies by treaty.  For instance, the South African BIT with Belgium 
and Luxembourg extends the coverage of the treaty for existing in-
vestments for a period of ten years following termination of the 
treaty,51 as does the BIT with Denmark52 and Spain.53  The latter ex-
plicitly includes dispute settlement provisions within the ambit of 
the survival clause.  The South Africa-China BIT has a ten-year sur-
vival clause.  The term of the survival clause for the BIT with the 
                                                   
51  Accord entre l’Union économique belgo-luxembourgeoise et la Ré-
publique d’Afrique du Sud concernant l’encouragement et la protection ré-
ciproques des investissements, Belg.-Lux. – S.Afr., art. 12(2), Aug. 14, 1998, 2218 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Belgium-Luxembourg – South Africa BIT] (providing that 
investments made prior to the expiry of the agreement shall remain subject to for a 
period of ten years from that date onward).  
52  Agreement Between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of 
South Africa Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Den.-S. Afr., art 16.2, Feb. 2, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Down-
load/TreatyFile/3521 [https://perma.cc/N29N-NHXQ]. 
53  Acuerdo para la Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones En-
tre el Reino de España y la República de Sudáfrica, Spain-S. Afr., art XII.3, Sept. 30, 
1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2276 
[https://perma.cc/H3TT-GSTD]. 
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Netherlands is fifteen years.54  The BIT with Austria provides a sur-
vival clause of twenty years55, as does the BIT with France56 and with 
Switzerland.57  With respect to these treaties, South Africa may be 
subject to investor-state arbitration until as late as 2024, should a dis-
pute arise regarding an investment made before 2014 and protected 
by a treaty denounced in 2014 with a twenty year survival clause. 
Terminated Indonesian BITs also include survival clauses: ten years 
for Cambodia, China, Italy, Lao, Malaysia, Norway, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Turkey and Vietnam.  The Indonesia-Netherlands BIT in-
cludes a fifteen years survival clause.  The Indonesia-France BIT is 
remarkable for its indefinite survival clause:  Article 10 provides that 
in the case of termination, the provisions of the treaty shall continue 
to apply to investments covered by the treaty and approved by the 
parties prior to the denunciation.58  The possibility of disputes being 
brought under expired treaties using survival clauses is not merely 
a theoretical one. Indonesia notified India of its intent not to renew 
the BIT between those two countries and the termination took effect 
in April 2016.  In the intervening period, Indian Metals & Ferro Al-
loys (IMFA) Limited initiated arbitration proceedings against Indo-
nesia under the lame duck BIT in November 2015 for USD 560 mil-
lion.59 
                                                   
54  Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments Between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
S. Afr.-Neth., art. 14.3, May 1, 1999, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2082 [https://perma.cc/MTL2-Q9YC]. 
55  Abkommen Zwischen der Regierung der Republik Österreich und der 
Regierung der Republik Südafrika Über die Förderung und den Gegenseitigen 
Schutz Von Investitionen Samt Protokoll, Austria-S. Afr., art. 12(3), Nov. 28, 1996, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/220 
[https://perma.cc/GF36-TVYZ]. 
56  Accord entre le gouvernement de la République française et le gou-
vernement de la République d’Afrique du Sud sur l’encouragement et la protection 
réciproques des investissements, Fr.-S. Afr., art. 11, Nov. 11, 1996, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1280 
[https://perma.cc/MQ4H-VY3U]. 
57  Accord entre le gouvernement le Conseil fédéral suisse et le gouverne-
ment de la République d’Afrique du Sud sur l’encouragement et la protection ré-
ciproques des investissements, Switz.-S. Afr., art. 13(2), June 27, 1995, http://in-
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2278 
[https://perma.cc/9CNX-56SU]. 
58  Belgium-Luxembourg – South Africa BIT, supra note 51, at art. 10 (“Au 
cas où le présent Accord viendrait à prendre fin, ses dispositions continueront à 
s’appliquer aux investissements couverts par ledit Accord et agréés par la Partie 
contractante préalablement à la dénonciation de cet Accord.”). 
59  Randy Fabi, Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys miner files $560 mln claim 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
380 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
With the issue of survival clauses now squarely in the limelight, 
other countries seeking to denunciate BITs should carefully consider 
the limited effect of such moves with respect to existing investments.  
It may be argued that in practice, an investment that has gone trou-
ble-free for several years is less likely to result in a major investor-
state dispute decades later.  At the same time, it may be that legisla-
tors in host states, thinking themselves free of the constraints of de-
nunciated BITs and the related exposure to arbitral claims, may take 
regulatory actions that are in fact still likely to trigger arbitral pro-
ceedings under the various survival clauses.  Together with the of-
ten poor tracking of the type, origin and nature of foreign invest-
ment in developing host countries, it may be very difficult for the 
government to ascertain the possible consequences of regulatory 
measures that could be seen as indirect expropriation under lapsed 
BITs.  That landscape may be even further complicated by investors 
who reincorporate and nominally recast their investment to fall 
within the ambit of another treaty, which might not yet have been 
denunciated, or might offer a longer survival clause. 
South Africa and Indonesia’s moves also offer important lessons 
in treaty drafting for those countries that are crafting new model 
BITs or currently negotiating investment agreements (bilaterally or 
as part of regional trade agreements).  A number of options could be 
considered.  First, survival clauses may be excluded altogether or 
dramatically shortened.  Second, survival clauses could be neutral-
ized by mutual agreement at the time of denunciation or termination 
of the treaty.  This technique was deployed by the Czech Republic60 
and was also utilized by Indonesia and Argentina.61  Third, survival 
clauses could extend to substantive rights and obligations, but not 
to the arbitration clause.  It may also be prudent to exclude the MFN 
clause from the ambit of any survival clause in order to avoid Maf-
fezini-type imports of dispute settlement provisions from other 
                                                   
against Indonesia, REUTERS, (Nov. 18, 2015 1:38 PM), http://in.reuters.com/arti-
cle/indonesia-imfa-idINKCN0T70O320151118 [https://perma.cc/PQ9B-VTL9] 
(“‘We are being sued for 7.7 trillion rupiah ($560 million) because they are unable 
to carry out production,’ Heriyanto [Director for Legal Affairs at Indonesia’s min-
ing Ministry] told reporters.”). 
60  Luke Eric Peterson, Czech Republic Terminates Investment Treaties in 
Such a Way as to Cast Doubt on Residual Legal Protection for Existing Investments, 
IAREPORTER, (Feb. 1, 2011). 
61  Luke Eric Petereson, Indonesia Ramps Up Termination of BITs – and Kills 
Survival Clause in One Such Treaty – But Faces New $600 Mil. Claim from Indian Mining 
Investor, BILATERALS.ORG (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.bilaterals.org/?indonesia-
ramps-up-termination-of [https://perma.cc/K754-DMZ4]. 
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BITs.62 
The discourse of South-South cooperation and resistance to the 
neoliberal framework of the 1990s has certainly led to shifts both in 
lexicon and in investment policy in a number of emerging countries.  
Some of the moves may be more effective than others as demon-
strated by survival clauses in BITs. 
 
3.  SEEKING A NEW BALANCE OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR 
INVESTORS 
 
From the treaty coverage to the nature of the rights and obliga-
tions of host and home states as well as investors, recent BITs signed 
by emerging countries and the model BITs they have developed of-
fer a departure from the consensus of the 1990s and early 2000s.  The 
process for defining negotiating positions also has evolved to be 
more inclusive and more deliberative. 
The new Indian Model BIT illustrates these trends.  In 2015, the 
Indian government published a draft Model BIT and requested com-
ments from the public.  The draft Model BIT deviated significantly 
from prior Indian Models and from BITs already signed by India.  
Observers noted that the draft Model represented a radical policy 
shift by the Indian National Congress-led government that had 
worked on it until May 2014.  Faced with claims based on very lib-
eral readings of the original BITs, the government seemed to wish to 
assert a narrower meaning for key terms, in response to the flood of 
claims filed since 2012.63  Noting that the draft severely restricts the 
potential impact of ISDS on policy space, some argued that the goal 
                                                   
62  In 2000, the tribunal in Maffezini v. Spain applied a BIT’s most-favored 
nation obligation (MFN) to procedural issues relating to jurisdiction. The award 
shaped some subsequent treaty negotiations as well as other ICSID arbitrations.  See 
generally Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/7, Award (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). More recently, RosInvest 
v. Russia, a Stockholm Chamber of Commerce arbitration, went even further by us-
ing an MFN clause to broaden the types of claims that could be brought under a 
BIT when another BIT signed by the host state included coverage for a wider range 
of claims.  See generally RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Case No. V079/2005, Award on 
Jurisdiction (Oct., 2007). 
63  See Grant Hanessian & Kabir Duggal, The 2015 India Model BIT: Is This 
the Change the World Wishes to See?, 30 ICSID  REV. 729, 731 (2015) (proliferation of 
claims after 2012 “caused the Indian establishment to consider redrafting its model 
BIT . . . .”).   
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was to foreclose the kinds of claims the country had faced recently.64  
It is no surprise, therefore, that it inspired a rather heated debate and 
submission of formal comments from groups as diverse as the In-
dian Law Commission and the US National Association of Manu-
facturers (NAM).  The NAM compared the draft Indian Model to 
“global standards” and found it sorely lacking in almost every 
way.65  The NAM’s brief claims that India had departed from estab-
lished international investment standards:  The coverage of invest-
ment was much too narrow; compulsory licensing of intellectual 
property would undermine efforts to attract high quality invest-
ment; exclusion of a broad commitment for fair and equitable treat-
ment violated international norms and created a lower standard for 
investors under any new agreements signed in the future than ex-
isted under current agreements; the definition of expropriation was 
too narrow and was “far below international standards”; and ISDS 
deviated from global best practice as illustrated by the US Model 
BIT because of an exhaustion of remedies requirement, jurisdic-
tional limits, and exclusion of review of Host State use of excep-
tions.66  The final version of the Model, amended under the Modi 
administration, addresses a number of these industry concerns, and 
realigns India to some degree with more traditional BIT drafting 
practices.  Some commentators argue that the adopted 2016 Model 
BIT, while ostensibly still seeking to reclaim policy space for regula-
tors and limit exposure to arbitration, fails on both counts.67 
This section explores changes to key aspects of investment 
                                                   
64  See DMD Advocates, Why India’s Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Is a Bit of a Misnomer, LEGALLYINDIA (May 11, 2015), http://www.legally-
india.com/views/entry/why-india-s-draft-model-bilateral-investment-treaty-is-
a-bit-of-a-misnomer [https://perma.cc/82JH-Y7E4] (“The changes brought in the 
Draft Model BIT grant minimal protection to investors and are more protective of 
India’s interests than of the investors.”).   
65  See NAT’L ASS’N OF MFRS., COMMENT ON DRAFT INDIAN MODEL 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 1 (2015), http://www.nam.org/Is-
sues/Trade/ISDS/NAM-Comments-on-Draft-India-Model-Bilateral-Investment-
Treaty-Joint-US-EU-Business.pdf [https://perma.cc/545V-WN68] (“[T]he NAM 
finds that there are many aspects of the draft Indian Model BIT that deviate sub-
stantially from global standards . . . .”).   
66  See id. at 2-7 (listing “the most concerning aspects” of the draft Model 
Indian BIT).   
67  See Prabhash Ranjan and Pushkar Anand, The 2016 Indian Model Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty: A Critical Deconstruction, 38 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcom-
ing 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2946041 [https://perma.cc/R2DK-TUZV] 
(discussing how India has not been able to balance investment protection with the 
host State’s right to regulate in the 2016 Model BIT).   
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agreements:  the definition of investments and investors (A), the 
rights and protections granted to investors (B), exceptions and der-
ogations to protect host states’ regulatory prerogative (C), and obli-
gations of investors and home states (D). 
 
3.1.  Redefining Investment and Investor 
 
FDI might have been understood in the 1980s and 1990s as a 
brick-and-mortar establishment into a host country funded and 
managed by a company located and operating in another country, 
but the current reality of foreign investment is considerably differ-
ent.  Today, much of what counts as foreign investment consists in 
intangible assets such as intellectual property and financial instru-
ments such as stocks and bonds.68  The nature of investors, too, has 
changed as various shell subsidiaries are typically used to route in-
vestment through several countries in order to decrease tax expo-
sure, take advantage of favorable regulatory frameworks, limit legal 
liability, and fulfill other strategic motivations.  Traditional treaty 
terms are now interpreted to include these ever-broadening and in-
creasingly amorphous notions of investment and investor, far be-
yond what the original negotiations had envisioned. 
A number of emerging countries that have traditionally been in 
the host-country position now question the implications of the di-
versification of conduits for foreign investment and the treaty pro-
tections these investments receive.  In an emerging policy conscious-
ness, these states wish to attract and protect only certain types of 
investment.  One set of issues relates to what does and should qual-
ify as a foreign investment.  The debate often focuses on the pur-
ported investment’s contribution to the local economy.  If the invest-
ment is short term, precarious, or purely a pass-through entity, 
should it really be considered as an investment and benefit from the 
full range of treaty protections?  At a more fundamental level, if the 
investment does involve some real and long-term local assets, but 
the benefits to the local economy are minimal or negative, should 
                                                   
68  GLOBAL INVESTMENT TREND MONITOR 2 (UNCTAD ed., 2005), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2016d1_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EU2-9RZJ] (noting that 2015 marked the strongest year for FDI 
flow since the 2008-2009 economic crisis, but these flows “lack[ed] productive im-
pact,” as they mostly consisted in mergers and acquisitions and other corporate re-
configurations, rather than greenfield investment projects).   
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the operation be treated differently than investments that have a 
positive local impact or at least deliver what they were contractually 
bound to produce?  Is it appropriate to extend BIT benefits to invest-
ments and investors that may be of a considerably different nature 
than those the treaties were originally drafted to protect?  In re-
sponse, new model BITs from India, Brazil, and elsewhere engage 
in efforts to restrict the definition of investment and investors. 
This section analyzes the solutions offered to these challenges by 
a number of new model BITs or other investment instruments from 
India, China, the SADC, Brazil and South Africa.  This list offers a 
full spectrum of approaches to foreign investment regulation:  India 
uses a full-fledged model BIT; China now negotiates BITs on an ad 
hoc basis, but had model BITs until about a decade ago; the SADC 
offers a looser model consisting of menus of options for each typical 
provision; Brazil customizes its CIFAs; South Africa relies on do-
mestic legislation. 
 
3.1.1.  India 
 
Compared to older Indian BITs, the 2016 Model uses a much 
more specific definition of investment, alongside a list of exclusions, 
and more detailed criteria regarding the definition of an investor.  
Most of the criteria and exclusions are aimed at covering greenfield 
investments and other investments that involve a real and produc-
tive economic activity in the host state with a genuine and direct link 
to the home state of origin of the investor.  The detailed definition 
provisions are clearly meant as a rollback on the expansive interpre-
tations of terms in traditional BITs and a response to some of the 
investor-state litigation and arbitration proceedings, such as those 
involving government bonds in Argentina. 
An investment is defined as “an enterprise constituted, orga-
nized and operated in good faith by an investor in accordance with 
the law of the Party in whose territory the investment is made, taken 
together with the assets of the enterprise, has the characteristics of 
an investment such as the commitment of capital or other resources, 
certain duration, the expectation of gain or profit, the assumption of 
risk and a significance for the development of the Party in whose 
territory the investment is made.”69  Additional qualifiers of the 
                                                   
69  2016 India Model BIT, supra note 29, art. 1.4.   
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term “enterprise” from the draft model BIT have been abandoned.  
These included the requirement that an enterprise had “its manage-
ment and real and substantial business operations in the territory of 
the Host State.”70  The following did not count for purposes of show-
ing “real and substantial business operations”:  presence and ar-
rangements mainly for purposes of avoiding tax liabilities; passive 
holding of financial instruments, land, or other property; and own-
ership or lease of real or personal property in a trade or business.71  
Conversely, a real and substantial business operation required at 
least “a substantial and long term commitment of capital in the Host 
state,” a “substantial number of employees” locally, the assumption 
of “entrepreneurial risk,” and “a substantial contribution to the de-
velopment of the Host State through its operations [along with] 
transfer of technological knowhow, where applicable.”72 
The draft Model BIT attempted to tackle the issue of investments 
nominally owned by a shell company set up in a country with a BIT 
solely for purposes of taking advantage of favorable treaty provi-
sions, avoiding certain legal liabilities, evading taxes, etc.  An “in-
vestor” was required to conduct “real and substantial business op-
erations” in the Home State if it was a legal entity or to be a natural 
person of the home state.73  It also addressed the problem of natural 
persons who possess several nationalities:  The test was the “domi-
nant and effective nationality,”74 in alignment with the general pub-
lic international law principle recognized by the International Court 
of Justice in the Nottebohm case.75  The 2016 Model BIT does away 
with these requirements76 and does not address the question of dual 
citizens.  Provisions excluding dual citizens from the ambit of the 
treaty protections are typically meant for two purposes.  First, they 
serve to exclude the application of a BIT vis-à-vis two dual citizens 
of the host and home state.  Second, in the case of dual citizens of 
the home state and a third state, they restrict the treaty’s application 
                                                   
70  India Draft Model BIT, supra note 28, art. 1.2(ii).   
71  Id at art. 1.2.2.   
72  Id. at art. 1.2.1.   
73  Id. at art. 1.9.   
74  Id. at art. 1.12.   
75  See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgement, 1955 I.C.J Rep. 4 
(Apr. 6) (establishing nationality by the presence of a real link between the natural-
ized person and the naturalizing state). 
76  2016 India Model BIT, supra note 29, art. 1.5.   
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to situations where the home state citizenship is the effective nation-
ality.  This limits a dual citizen’s ability to engage in treaty shopping.  
Since India does not allow dual citizenship,77 the first scenario 
would not arise in practice and the second scenario would only 
come up when India is the host state. 
The 2016 Model BIT does, however, categorically exclude a long 
list of “assets” from the definition of an investment.  As a result, the 
listed tangible and intangible properties and interests are excluded 
from the ambit of the treaty and may not benefit from its provisions, 
including dispute settlement clauses.  Such assets would presuma-
bly be solely covered by domestic law and potentially any residual 
customary international law protection not displaced by the treaty.  
The list of exclusions covers government bonds and other debt in-
struments (likely in reaction to the 2001 Argentina debt default78), 
portfolio investments, any pre-establishment expenditures (likely in 
response to claims such as Santa Elena SA v. Costa Rica79), claims re-
sulting from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services, 
                                                   
77  See INDIA CONST. art. 9 (“No person shall be a citizen of India . . . if he 
has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any foreign State.”).   
78  Amongst the dozens of claims and proceedings, the following cases 
garnered the most attention: CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005); CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of 
the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic 
(Sept. 25, 2007), available at  http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C4/DC505_En.pdf  http://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC687_En&caseId=C4[https://perma.cc/DV4U-ZD93]; LG&E En-
ergy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability 
(Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203 (2006); Enron Corp. Ponderosa Asset, L.P. v. Ar-
gentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007), 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WC33-HA4M]; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007),  available at 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/28SA-63VP].  See generally William W. Burke-White, The Argen-
tine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID 
System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INTL HEALTH L. & POL’Y 199 (2008); José E. Alvarez 
& Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors – A Glimpse in the 
Heart of the Investment Regime, 2008-09 YEARBOOK INTL INVEST L. & POL’Y. 379 
(2009). 
79  Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. The Republic of Costa 
Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award (Feb. 17, 2000), http://icsid-
files.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C152/DC539_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NL2F-E2U6], 5 ICSID Rep. 157 (2002), supra note 7. 
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the likes of goodwill, brand value, market shares (perhaps in re-
sponse to claims by Philip Morris in Australia80 and elsewhere 
where the intellectual property claims were really a proxy for pro-
tection of the brand),  and money judgment or arbitral award recov-
ery.81 
 
3.1.2.  China 
 
China has historically defined investment and investor rather 
broadly in BITs to which it subscribed (first generation spanning 
1982 to 1998 and second generation from 1998 to 2008) and the most 
recent investment agreements as well as the draft 4th model BIT 
mostly carry on that tradition with respect to the definition of in-
vestment.  However, some argue that a number of other clauses are 
drafted more restrictively.82  Third generation BITs or recent FTAs 
addressing investment sometimes exclude certain types of business 
transactions, such as commercial contracts for the sale of goods or 
services, and certain classes of assets, such as certain loans and 
debts.83  However, China tends to retain a fairly broad definition of 
investment even in its third generation agreements.  For instance, 
                                                   
80  Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (H.K.) v. Austl., PCA Case Repository 2012-12 
(Perm. Ct. Arb., 2012), https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/5 
[https://perma.cc/9GXZ-WHU5].  See generally Inaê Siqueira de Oliveira, Corpo-
rate Restructuring and Abuse of Rights: PCA Tribunal Deems Philip Morris’s 
Claims Against Austrailia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Rules Inadmissible, INV. 
TREATY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/philip-mor-
ris-asia-limited-v-the-commonwealth-of-australia-pca-case-no-2012-12/ 
[https://perma.cc/6XCQ-T5PY] (providing a summary of the case).   
81  2016 India Model BIT, supra note 29, art. 1.4.   
82  See Elodie Dulac, Chinese Investment Treaties: What Protection for Foreign 
Investment in China, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 237, 242-43 (Michael Moser, 
ed. 2012).   
83  See Elodie Dulac, Chinese Investment Treaties: What Protection for Foreign 
Investment in China, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 237, 256 (Michael Moser, ed. 
2012); Karl Sauvant & Michael D. Nolan, China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
and International Investment Law, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 893, 918 (2015) (discussing 
China’s exclusions in its new definition of investments).  See, e.g., Agreement Be-
tween the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China, art. 
1.k, Sept. 9, 2012, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty-
File/3476 [https://perma.cc/QZD2-77C6] (applying exclusions to the term “in-
vestment”).  
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the fourth draft model BIT defines investments broadly and pro-
vides a non-exhaustive illustrative list that includes shares, stocks, 
debts, rights under contracts, intellectual property rights, rights con-
ferred by concessions or licenses and other tangible and intangible 
property.84  Recent Chinese BITs and trade agreements including an 
investment chapter reflect this broad definition.85 
 
3.1.3.  SADC Model BIT 
 
Rather than draft a model BIT strictly speaking, the SADC de-
veloped a range of recommended drafting options, with a commen-
tary detailing some of the pros and cons of each option.  With respect 
to the definition of investment, it offers three formulae:  an enter-
prise-based definition that focuses on corporate establishment or ac-
quisition (inspired by the commercial presence definition in the 
WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services), an asset-based 
definition with a limitative, exhaustive list of qualifying assets 
(based on the Canadian model BIT) and a broader asset-based defi-
nition with an illustrative, non-exhaustive list (based on the U.S. 
model BIT).  The commentary ultimately recommends the first op-
tion (enterprise-based definition) as being more likely to “promote 
investment that is supportive of sustainable development, which de-
velopment policy suggests means business that brings constructive 
                                                   
84  See Draft New Model BIT, China, art. 1.3, reprinted in NORAH 
GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE 
app. V (2009) [hereinafter China Draft Model BIT].   
85  See, e.g., Accord de Cooperation entre le Gouvernement de la Ré-
publique du Congo et le Gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine sur 
la Promotion et la Protection des Investissements, China-Congo, art. 1, Mar. 20, 
2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3586 
[https://perma.cc/8CWJ-4HDY]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government 
of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, Austl.-China, 
art. 9.1, June 17, 2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty-
File/3453 [https://perma.cc/MT8Y-P6NQ]; Free Trade Agreement Between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic 
of Korea, China-S. Korea, art. 12.1, June 1, 2015, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3462 [https://perma.cc/KA2V-EAAR]; 
Agreement Among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of 
Korea and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion, 
Faciliation and Protection of Investment, Japan-S. Korea-China, art. 1, May 17, 2014,  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2633 
[https://perma.cc/2ULN-AS3J].   
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economic and social benefits.”86  By contrast, it strongly advises 
against the third option (open list of assets) because it gives much 
discretion to arbitral tribunals in determining what qualifies as an 
investment, typically playing out in favor of the investor, and creat-
ing much uncertainty for the host state. 
Like the Indian draft Model BIT (but unlike the 2016 India Model 
BIT), the SADC text provides some language regarding long-term 
establishment, and attempts to prevent shell corporations from ben-
efiting from treaty provisions.  The recommendation is a slightly 
modified version of the Salini arbitration award87 stating that “[i]n 
order to qualify as an investment under this Agreement, an asset 
must have the characteristics of an investment, such as the [substan-
tial] commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of 
gain or profit, the assumption of risk and a significance for the Host 
State’s development.”  Although the language is not as pointed as 
in the Indian version, the objective of limiting treaty protection to 
“productive” investment is common to both texts and reflects lan-
guage promoted by UNCTAD. 
With respect to investors, the SADC proposals also aims to pro-
tect only genuine investors of the home state, rather than pass-
through, shell entities incorporated in a particular state only for le-
gal convenience.  Investors who are dual citizens must be “predom-
inantly a resident of the Home State,” and the SADC model also sug-
gests excluding dual citizens who hold the citizenship of the host 
state.  Regarding juridical persons, the SADC text proposes a num-
ber of alternative clauses.  The first relies on the simple formality of 
incorporation in the home state, which would not resolve issues re-
lating to investment or taxation treaty shopping.  Three other pro-
posals add to legal incorporation a requirement of effective owner-
ship and control by a juridical person of the home state, and possibly 
a requirement of substantial business activity in the home state.  The 
commentary makes it clear that states concerned about treaty shop-
ping should adopt one of the more robust versions, rather than the 
simple incorporation test. 
Although it references the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) as an example of a legal framework for 
an investor definition that includes the substantial business test, the 
                                                   
86  SADC, SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE WITH 
COMMENTARY 13 (2012) [hereinafter SADC Model BIT].   
87  Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003). 
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1993 Treaty Establishing the COMESA88 does not include such a def-
inition and in fact adopts a very traditional and investor-friendly 
approach to the definition of investment.89  Negotiations currently 
under way at the African Union to design a Pan African Investment 
Code that would likely result in a text that is closer to the features of 
the SADC model than to Chapter Twenty-Six of the COMESA 
Treaty.  The hope is that such a text would also serve as model for 
regional groupings and BITs involving African countries. 
 
3.1.4.  Brazil CIFAs 
 
The new series of Brazilian Cooperation and Investment Facili-
tation Agreements (“CIFAs”) appears to experiment with slightly 
varying investor and investment definitions.  The Brazil-Angola 
agreement stands out as it leaves the definition of investment and 
investor to be determined under the domestic law of the respective 
countries.90 
The Mozambique CIFA, the first of the series, indicates that to 
qualify an investment must involve the establishment of a long-last-
ing enterprise that will produce goods and services.91  As in the India 
Model BIT, portfolio investments, sovereign debts and money 
claims arising out of commercial contracts for the sale of goods and 
services are excluded.  This language is reflected in other CIFAs, 
with the exception of Angola, noted above.92  The intent seems to be 
                                                   
88  Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Af-
rica, Nov. 5, 1993, 2314 U.N.T.S 265.   
89  See id. art. 159.2 (listing the activities to be condidered as investments 
under the agreement). 
90  Acordo de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos entre o Governo 
da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República de Angola, Braz.-
Angl., art. 3, Apr. 1, 2015, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.un-
ctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4720 [https://perma.cc/8N5J-X27X] [hereinafter 
Angola CIFA]. 
91  Mozambique CIFA, supra note 35 at art.3.1. 
92  Investment Cooperation And Facilitation Agreement Between The 
Federative Republic Of Brazil And The Republic Of Malawi, Braz.-Malawi, art. 2.1, 
June 25, 2015, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Down-
load/TreatyFile/4715 [https://perma.cc/PTL6-CKHV] [hereinafter Malawi CIFA] 
(stating in Article 2 that the term “investment” does not include debt securities is-
sued by a government, portfolio investments, or claims to money arising solely 
from commercial contracts). 
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to limit coverage to new investments that expand the nation’s pro-
ductive capabilities.  Intellectual property is not explicitly included 
in the illustrative list of assets that may constitute an investment, but 
nor is it excluded either in the CIFAs with Mozambique and Malawi.  
The later CIFAs with Mexico, Colombia, and Chile do include intel-
lectual property as a possible investment asset and incorporates by 
reference the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement for purposes of determining what 
qualifies as intellectual property.93 
The definition of investor varies perhaps more significantly 
across CIFAs.  The Mozambique CIFA merely relies on formal in-
corporation criteria for juridical entities:  The state of incorporation 
suffices to determine whether an entity qualifies as an investor un-
der the treaty.94  The Mexico CIFA adopts a somewhat more strin-
gent approach, requiring formal establishment in the territory of the 
parties, as well as having “its headquarters and the center of its eco-
nomic activities in the territory of that Party,”95 and the Malawi 
CIFA adds a third requirement that the “property or effective con-
trol belongs, directly or indirectly, to nationals or permanent resi-
dents of the parties.”96  A slightly different approach prevails in the 
Colombia CIFA requiring juridical investors to have substantial 
business activities in the territory of the home state party,97 as does 
the Chile CIFA.98  Hence, while the Mozambique treaty would not 
exclude shell entities set up for purposes of treaty shopping, the Ma-
lawi, Chile, Colombia and Mexico CIFAs would make it harder for 
such entities to be used.  It is likely that the drafting changed after 
the first CIFA with Mozambique was released and critiqued.  Only 
one CIFA addresses the dual nationality issue for natural persons: 
The Colombia CIFA excludes investors who hold the nationality of 
both parties, except if they have been continuously maintained their 
                                                   
93  Mexico CIFA, art. 3.1.2(e); Colombia CIFA, art. 3.1.2(e); Acuerdo de 
Cooperación y Facilitación de Inversiones entre la República Federativa del Brasil 
y la República de Chile, Braz.-Chile, art. 1.1.4(f), Nov. 24, 2015, available at http://in-
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4712 
[https://perma.cc/E7UT-HY7S] [hereinafter Chile CIFA]. 
94  Mozambique CIFA, art. 3.2. 
95  Mexico CIFA, art. 3.1.3. 
96  Malawi CIFA, art. 2.1. 
97  Colombia CIFA, art. 3.1.5. 
98  Chile CIFA, art. 1.1.7.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
392 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
residence outside of the state party where they are making the in-
vestment.99 
 
3.1.5.  South Africa 
 
With respect to countries not covered or no longer covered by a 
BIT, South Africa’s Protection of Investment Act provides a domes-
tic law framework governing pre- and post-establishment matters, 
many of which traditionally would have been addressed by a BIT.  
Under section two, an investment within the meaning of the Act re-
quires the establishment of an enterprise under South African law, 
which “commit[s] resources of economic value over a reasonable pe-
riod of time, in anticipation of profit.”100  Share in such an enterprise 
also qualifies as an investment.  That language can be interpreted 
broadly or narrowly, and therefore does not offer much guidance to 
investors.  For instance, it is unclear whether preliminary scoping 
and feasibility studies would qualify as “resources of economic 
value,” such as to trigger the protection of the law.  Resources ex-
panded to conduct environmental impact assessments or other sur-
veys in anticipation of obtaining permits have been used to trigger 
investor state arbitration claims under BITs in the past, but the Act’s 
language is ambiguous in that respect.  The Indian model BIT, by 
contrast, specifically excludes such expenditures from the ambit of 
the investment definition.  The “reasonable period of time” for the 
investment is also a looser standard than the long-term require-
ments present in some other models.  Particularly if pre-establish-
ment surveying and business model studies are included as a qual-
ifying “resource of economic value,” and are used to demonstrate 
the “anticipation of profit,” the mere amount of time needed to ob-
tain such studies, typically over one year, may arguably also satisfy 
the “reasonable period of time” criterion.  In that scenario, the pro-
posed law might serve little to change investors’ behavior, com-
pared to traditional BITs. 
The investors seem to be equated with “an enterprise making an 
                                                   
99  Colombia CIFA, art. 3.1.4.1. 
100  Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 § 2 (S. Afr.) available at 
https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/39514_Act22of2015ProtectionO-
fInvestmentAct.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HJ8-GGXG] (including lawful enterprises 
in South Africa within the definition of “investment”).   
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investment in the Republic regardless of nationality,”101 and an en-
terprise is further defined as “any natural person or juristic person 
whether incorporated or unincorporated.”102  The law intends to 
regulate domestic and foreign investors alike, so long as they make 
an investment in South Africa.  Dual nationality issues where the 
investor is South African and holds another citizenship are therefore 
inapposite. 
 
3.1.6.  Common Trends 
 
Although a number of different strategies are emerging in recent 
BITs and model BITs drafted by emerging countries, a common 
trend is the attempt to circumscribe who qualifies as an investor and 
what counts as a protected investment.  As we have seen, under 
many new style agreements in several countries, investors, which 
used to qualify merely on the basis of incorporation in the home 
state (and, at times, an additional requirement that the seat of the 
company be in the home state), are now subject to the additional 
requirement of conducting substantial business activity in the home 
state, or of being owned or controlled by nationals of the home 
state.103  Such restrictions may also apply if an investor seeks arbi-
tration under the ICSID Convention, thereby facing the jurisdiction 
requirements of Article 25(1)104 and its jurisprudence, including the 
Salini test discussed above.  Like India, the SADC and others, China 
implements such restrictions to avoid the treaty shopping phenom-
enon, where shell companies are set up solely for purposes of qual-
ifying under a taxation treaty, a BIT or a free trade agreement in-
cluding an investment chapter. 
Moreover, there is some clear learning patterns, where states 
take stock of arbitral developments, particularly, but not exclusively 
                                                   
101  Id. at §1 (S. Afr.).  
102  Id. 
103  Dulac, supra note 80, at 250. 
104  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T 1270, T.I.A.S 6090, 
575 U.N.T.S 159, (“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State [or any constitu-
ent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that 
State] and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute 
consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their con-
sent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”). 
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those involving them directly, and are aware of other states’ practice 
on the issues of investor and investment definitions.  This is sug-
gested, for instance, in the evolution of the Brazil CIFA drafting, 
which incorporated more specific language in later drafts in line 
with the type of provisions or at least issue awareness prevalent in 
other emerging country BITs. Regional and international organiza-
tions, in particular UNCTAD, also play a key role in sharing and 
disseminating current practices.105 
It is noteworthy that the push in a number of emerging countries 
towards narrowing the definitions of investors and investment in 
BITs or investment chapters in FTAs is also reflected in the 2004 US 
Model BIT.  The EU-Canada Trade Agreement (“CETA”) also re-
flects this trend. It specifies that investment means “[e]very kind of 
asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that 
has the characteristics of an investment, which includes a certain du-
ration and other characteristics such as the commitment of capital or 
other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption 
of risk,” followed by a non-exhaustive list of assets.106  Like several 
of the newer emerging country models discussed above, the CETA 
also excludes from qualifying investment “claims to money that 
arise solely from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or ser-
vices by a natural person or enterprise in the territory of a Party to a 
natural person or enterprise in the territory of the other Party, do-
mestic financing of such contracts, or any related order, judgment, 
or arbitral award.”107  Regarding investors, the CETA specifies that 
juridical investors must be enterprises that are “constituted or or-
ganised under the laws of that Party and [have] substantial business 
                                                   
105  See e.g., UNCTAD, Rep. of the Investment, Enterprise and Develop-
ment Commission on Its Seventh session, ¶ 3, 8-10, TD/B/C.II/31, (2015), available 
at http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciid31_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7GN6-BTGH] (providing an example of the UNCTAD’s role in 
signaling arbitral developments); see generally Investment Policy Framework For 
Sustainable Development, UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2015/5 (UNCTAD, ed., 2015), 
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/32XT-BFNQ]; Rep. of the Expert Meeting on the Transformation 
of the International Investment Agreement Regime: The Path Ahead, 
TD/B/C.II/EM.4/3 (UNCTAD, ed., 2015), available at http://unctad.org/meet-
ings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciiem4d3_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YEM-LZB6].  
106  Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, art. 8.1, 
Oct. 30, 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-
chapter-by-chapter/ [https://perma.cc/J5WN-UA5H]. 
107  Id. 
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activities in the territory of that Party; or an enterprise that is consti-
tuted or organised under the laws of that Party and is directly or 
indirectly owned or controlled by a natural person of that Party or 
by an enterprise mentioned under paragraph (a).”108 
 
3.2.  Defining and Constraining Investor Protections 
 
This section analyzes the spectrum of positions taken by emerg-
ing economies on the nature and extent of the protections offered to 
investors.  As we found for the definition of investment and inves-
tor, these provisions can be found in several sources, ranging from 
the familiar formal of bilateral investment treaties (India, China and 
SADC), to alternative investment instruments (Brazil) and domestic 
approaches (South Africa). 
 
3.2.1.  India 
 
The 2016 Model BIT spells out rights and protections for inves-
tors in great detail.  Article 2.3 appears to displace customary inter-
national law by limiting parties’ obligations to those explicitly stated 
in the treaty (and in some cases, the treaty terms do incorporate cus-
tomary international law by reference).109  This can be seen as an ef-
fort to control efforts by arbitrators to expand the scope of otherwise 
broad terms such as “fair and equitable treatment.” 
 
Standard of treatment 
 
Unlike most traditional BITs, the draft India Model BIT did not 
include a general guarantee of “fair and equitable treatment” or of 
“full protection and security.”  Instead, Article 3 on standard of 
treatment protected foreign investments from denial of justice under 
customary international law, “egregious violations of due process,” 
and “manifestly abusive treatment involving continuous, unjusti-
fied and outrageous coercion or harassment.”110  This eliminated the 
                                                   
108  Id. 
109  Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, India, art. 2.3. 
110  2016 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, India, art. 3 supra note 28.  
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possibility of using the fair and equitable treatment language to cre-
ate a right to protection of “legitimate expectations.”  The 2016 India 
Model BIT does include “full protection and security,” albeit limited 
to “a Party’s obligations relating to physical security of investors 
and to investments made by the investors of the other Party and not 
to any other obligation whatsoever.”111  Additionally, Article 4 pro-
vides for national treatment but indicates that the assessment of 
“like circumstances” depends on “the totality of the circumstances, 
including whether the relevant treatment distinguishes between in-
vestors or investments on the basis of legitimate regulatory objec-
tives.112 These circumstances include, but are not limited to, (a) the 
goods or services consumed or produced by the investment; (b) the 
actual and potential impact of the investment on third persons, the 
local community, or the environment, (c) whether the investment is 
public, private, or state-owned or controlled, and (d) the practical 
challenges of regulating the investment”.113 
There is no most-favored nation section in the India Model BIT 
and no explanation for its absence. This is probably the result of the 
White Industries v. India arbitration where an Australian investor 
used a clause in the India-Kuwait BIT to expand protection for an 
Australian company.  It reflects a general concern among emerging 
economies of the use of MFN to expand jurisdiction and substantive 
content beyond the intended scope of a specific BIT. 
Also absent from the 2016 India Model BIT is an umbrella clause 
guaranteeing that the parties will abide by their contractual commit-
ments with foreign investors.  Breach of contracts between the host 
state and the foreign investors would not typically be actionable un-
der a treaty but some ICSID arbitrations interpreted umbrella 
clauses to elevate contractual breaches to treaty breaches. Such a rea-
soning allowed investors to circumvent choice of forum clauses in 
the underlying contract (particularly where the designated forum 
was a domestic court of the host state) and bring instead an investor-
state arbitration claim under the treaty.114 
                                                   
111  Id. at art. 3.2.  
112  Id. at art. 4.  
113  Id. at fn 2.  
114  See e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. The Republic of 
Para., ICSID Case No.ARB/07/29, (Feb. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1525.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZR5N-RLZN]. But see SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA 
v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ISCID Case No ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections 
to Jurisdiction, (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406 (2005) (holding that Article 11 of the 
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Last, the Model treaty’s standard of treatment clause must be 
read in the context of provisions regarding the state’s ability to ap-
ply its law.  Article 2.3 excludes from the ambit of the treaty claims 
“arising our of events which occurred, or claims which have been 
raised prior to the entry into force of this Treaty.”115  Additionally, 
Article 2.4 carves out from the treaty local government measures, 
which is a vast exclusion for a federal state like India, any measure 
related to taxation and a number of other issues such as compulsory 
licenses of intellectual property rights, government procurement, 
and subsidies.116  The draft Model BIT included the same exclusions 
and safe-harbored existing laws and regulations or their progeny 
from challenges under the treaty.117 
 
Expropriation and compensation 
 
The 2016 India Model BIT narrows the concept of expropriation.  
The draft follows prior practice by stating that a party shall not na-
tionalize or expropriate or take “measures having an effect equiva-
lent to expropriation” except for a public purpose, in accordance 
with the procedure established by law and “on payment of adequate 
compensation.”118  While “public purpose” cannot be defined spe-
cifically, the Model offers a non-exhaustive list, whereby certain 
measures are automatically considered to constitute a public pur-
pose: non-discriminatory measures (including “awards by judicial 
bodies”) to protect public health, safety and the environment119  and 
                                                   
Pakistan-Switzerland BIT, which deviated from standard umbrella clause formula-
tions, did not permit to elevate the contractual breach to a treaty claim), available at 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ic-
sid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C205/DC622_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP5K-
FHCL]; Compania de Aguas del Acqunija SA et al v. Arg., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, Award, (Nov. 21, 2000), 40 ILM 426 (2001); Compania de Aguas del 
Acqunija SA et al v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment,  
(Mar. 3, 2001) and Award (Aug. 20, 2007), 6 ICSID Rep. 340 (2004) (finding that 
contractual violations do not necessarily amount to a BIT breach), available at 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MX67-SQSC]; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Arg., ICSID 
Case No. 01/08, Award (May 12,  2005), 44 I.L.M 1205 (2005). 
115  2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 29, at art. 2.3. 
116  Id. at art. 2.4 (stating that the treaty does not apply to local govern-
ment measures). 
117  Indian Draft Model BIT, art. 2.1, supra note 28 (mirroring the exclu-
sions to local government measures of the 2016 Model BIT). 
118  2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 29, India, art. 5.1. 
119  Id. at art. 5.5. 
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measures relating to land that conform to the law relating to land 
acquisition (for India).120  Public purpose is defined by implication 
in contrast to “action[s] taken by a Party in its commercial capac-
ity”,121 which are deemed not to count as “public purpose.” 
Further, the 2016 Model BIT establishes strict limits on what con-
stitutes a “Measure. . .equivalent to expropriation,” which aims at 
circumscribing claims for indirect expropriation.  An indirect expro-
priation occurs if a state’s measure “substantially or permanently 
deprives the investor of the fundamental attributes of property in its 
investment, including the right to use, enjoy and dispose of its in-
vestment.122  However, the mere fact that a state measure has an ad-
verse economic impact on an investment is not sufficient to prove 
that an indirect expropriation has occurred.123 
Monetary awards for expropriation and other claims by inves-
tors are circumscribed to “the loss suffered by the investor,” reduced 
by any mitigating factors including restitution made by the state, re-
peal or modification of the measures at stake, and possibly “current 
and past use of the investment, the history of its acquisition and pur-
pose, compensation received by the investor from other sources, any 
unremedied harm or damage that the investor has caused to the en-
vironment or local community or other relevant considerations re-
garding the need to balance public interest and the interests of the 
investor.”124 
No doubt that experiences such as oil concessional develop-
ments in the Niger delta in Nigeria and in the Amazon region of 
Ecuador, or the Bhopal industrial disaster in India, with their dev-
astating social and environmental impact on the local communities, 
loomed large in the drafters’ minds with respect both to the scope of 
legitimate expropriations and to the measure of compensation. The 
difficulty that aggrieved communities and individuals have had in 
vindicating their claims125 clearly militates for an ex-ante treatment 
                                                   
120  Id. at art. 5.1; Id. fn 3.  
121  Id. at art. 5.4. 
122  Id. at art. 5.3(a)(ii). 
123  Id. at art. 5.3(b)(i). 
124  Id. at art. 26.3; Id. fn 4. 
125  See e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a claim that corporate actors aided human right abuses did not fall 
within the Alien Tort Claims Act); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the United Kingdom was a more appropriate forum for 
a claim involving human rights violations in Nigeria by companies with more sub-
stantial business contacts with the UK than with the United States); Chevron v. 
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of the issue at the BIT and establishment level, combined with the 
possibility for the host state to intervene post-establishment, should 
the need arise.  The Model BIT does not address the possibility of 
the “mitigating factors” resulting in a negative valuation of compen-
sation, i.e., where the investor would be found to owe money, rather 
than the host state. 
Whereas the draft Model BIT implicitly posited foreign invest-
ment as a privilege that may be revoked or curtailed if it is exercised 
in a way that adversely impacts the local socio-economic or environ-
mental context, the 2016 final version oft he Model BIT is less in-
sistent on balancing investment protection and the host state’s socio-
economic development, including encouraging investments aligned 
with its priorities and discouraging investments that bring little or 
no developmental value.  Nonetheless, some of the more controver-
sial language of the draft was maintained in the final version, albeit 
in footnotes.126 
3.2.2.  China 
The content of investor protection in China’s three generations 
of BITs and from one individual BIT to another varies to some de-
gree.  Likewise, China’s treatment of references to international law 
in BITs has evolved over time.  Reluctance to accept customary in-
ternational law wholesale has been a long-standing position of 
China, which views international law as largely the product of cap-
italist imperialist legal systems.127 
 
Standard of Treatment 
 
The inclusion and treatment of fair and equitable clauses illus-
trates these dynamics.  Some Chinese BITs omit such clauses alto-
gether,128 a number include a commitment to treat investments fairly 
and equitably, without specifying what such treatment might en-
tail.129  Starting in 2001, some Chinese BITs refer to international law 
                                                   
Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) could be applied extraterritorially due to 
substantial contacts with the United States). 
126  Compare 2016 India Model BIT footnote 4, supra note 29 with Draft 
Model BIT, supra note 28 at art. 5.6, 5.7 and related Explanatory Notes. 
127  Dulac, supra note 80. 
128  Id at 266.  
129  See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India 
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in reference to fair and equitable treatment, in different formulae 
ranging from a restrictive “fair and equitable treatment in accord-
ance with applicable principles of international law recognized by 
both Contracting Parties,”130 to a more general but ambiguous “fair 
and equitable treatment, in accordance with principles of interna-
tional law.”131  The more recent China-Mexico BIT (2008) inaugu-
rates an even broader recognition of fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security, defined as the protection required 
“by the international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens 
as evidence of State practice and opinio juris.”132  The clear reference 
to international customary law was subsequently reinforced in the 
2009 China-Peru BIT.133 The joint phrasing for fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security in reference to customary 
law, as illustrated by the China-Mexico BIT, is fairly typical of third 
generation Chinese BITs134 and is reflected in the latest draft Model 
BIT.135 
                                                   
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, China-India, art. 3.2, Nov. 21, 2006, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/742 [https://perma.cc/PSF7-ZQGY] 
(“Investments . . . shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment.”).  
130  Agreement Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Jordan, art. 3.2, Nov. 15, 2001, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/748 
[https://perma.cc/N3MS-H8L7] (not in force). 
131  Accord Sur la Promotion et la Protection Réciproques des Investisse-
ments entre le Gouvernement de la Republique de Madagascar et le Gouvernement 
de la République Populaire de Chine, China-Madag., art. 3.1, Nov. 21, 2005, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/758 
[https://perma.cc/9DR5-7LRM] (“[C]hacune des Parties Contractantes s’engage à 
assurer, sur son territoire défini plus haut, un traitement juste et équitable, con-
formément aux principes du Droit international, aux investissements des nationaux 
et sociétés de l’autre Partie Contractante et à faire en sorte que l’exercice du droit 
ainsi reconnu ne soit entravé en droit, ni en fait.”).  
132  Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States 
and the Government of the People ́s Republic of China on the Promotion and Re-
ciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Mex., art. 5.2, July 11, 2008, http://in-
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/759 
[https://perma.cc/EY2K-HNDZ].  
133  Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Peru and the Government of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the En-
couragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, April 4, 2009, http://in-
vestmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2586 
[https://perma.cc/LE5B-Q7WA]. 
134  Dulac, supra note 80, at 270. 
135  Draft New Model BIT, China, art. 3, reprinted in NORAH GALLAGHER & 
WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE app. V (2009) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/2
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While older BITs, especially second-generation treaties from the 
late 1990s and 2000s, often include an umbrella clause, which ex-
tends protection to contracts entered into between the investor and 
the Host government,136 the more recent third-generation BITs make 
no such undertaking.137  This position, held in common with some 
other emerging countries, is likely in reaction to arbitral interpreta-
tions elevating contractual violations to treaty breaches through the 
use of umbrella clauses.138 
Most favored nation treatment clauses have been a relatively 
common feature of Chinese BITs, with varying language.139  The 
2003 Model BIT’s National Treatment clause reads: “Neither the 
Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities associated 
with such investments of the other Contracting Party to treatment 
less favorable then that accorded to the investments and associated 
activities by the investors of any third State.”140  China is clearly 
aware of the Maffezini line of cases and the controversy about 
whether to use MFN clauses to import broader dispute resolution 
clauses from other BITs.  The investment chapter of the 2008 China-
New Zealand Free Trade Agreement explicitly excludes dispute res-
olution from the ambit of the MFN clause.141  This approach, and 
other exclusions, is also reflected in the new draft Chinese Model 
                                                   
[hereinafter China Draft Model BIT]. 
136  For a history and interpretation of umbrella clauses in Chinese first 
and second generations BITs, see Dulac, supra note 80, at 277-79; Wenhua Shan, 
Umbrella Clauses and Investment Contracts Under Chinese BITs: Are the Latter Covered 
by the Former?, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 135, 136-45 (2010) (discussing umbrella 
clauses in Chinese BITs and their legal implications). 
137  See Sauvant & Nolan, supra note 81, at 919 (noting that China has fol-
lowed the example of the USA and other nations in abandoning umbrella clauses).  
138   Id. (discussing how China has revised its model dispute settlement 
clause in response to claimants’ attempts to elevate contract breaches to interna-
tional treaty violations). 
139  See Id. at 922 (“It was the regular practice of drafters of China’s 
BITs . . . to include a most-favored nation (MFN) clause.”); John Savage & Elodie 
Dulac, Chinese Investment Treaties and the Dispute Resolution Opportunities Offered by 
Most Favored Nations Provisions, STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV., no. 3, 2008, at 1, 10, 29-
33 (discussing the various wordings of MFN clauses in Chinese BITs). 
140  Chinese Model BIT Version III, China, art. 3, reprinted in NORAH 
GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE 
app. IV (2009) [hereinafter 2003 China Model BIT]. 
141  See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-N.Z., art. 139.2, Apr. 
7, 2008, 2590 U.N.T.S. 101 (“[T]he obligation in this Article does not encompass a 
requirement to extend . . . dispute resolution procedures . . . .”). 
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BIT.142 
By contrast to the relatively ubiquitous and traditional MFN 
clauses, China resisted national treatment clauses in its early BIT ne-
gotiating history.  Such clauses became more standard since the late 
1990s, though at times with the restrictive note that such treatment 
is only granted “in accordance with [China’s] laws and regula-
tions.”143  Moreover, national treatment is often restricted to post-
establishment treatment, even where the treaty also covers admis-
sion of the foreign investment.  The 2003 Model BIT’s National 
Treatment clause states: “Without prejudice to its laws and regula-
tions, each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activ-
ities associated with such investments by the investors of the other 
Contracting Party treatment not less favorable than that accorded to 
the investments and associated activities by its own investors.”144  
Although the 2003 Model BIT mentions that the parties “shall en-
courage investors of the other Contracting Party to make invest-
ments in its territory and admit such investments in accordance with 
its laws and regulations,”145 the remainder of the treaty obligations 
focus on post-establishments rights and protections.  By contrast, the 
subsequent draft Model BIT would extend national treatment pro-
tection to the admission of investments to the extent of a yet-to-be 
drafted Annex.146 
With respect to standards of treatment, then, the current Chinese 
BIT policy seems to be more aligned with the traditional BITs frame-
work, albeit with some modifications to take account of recent arbi-
tral developments.  Overall, though, China seems to be increasing 
the scope of protection for foreign investors in its agreements, which 
represents a move away from its earlier more restrictive position.  In 
this sense, China seems to be bucking the trend among emerging 
economies, many of which are trying to restrict the scope of their 
BITs.  However, the picture is quite complex because China’s cur-
rent policy is to negotiate on a case-by-case basis, which may ac-
count for the variety of drafting approaches in its latest BITs. 
                                                   
142  China Draft Model BIT, supra note 135, at arts. 4.2 & 4.3 (excluding 
treatment granted in regional trade agreements and “arrangements for facilitating 
small scale frontier trade in boarder (sic) areas.”). 
143  Dulac, supra note 80, at 285; Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations 
and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral 
Implications, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 457, 471 (2009). 
144  2003 China Model BIT, supra note 140, at art. 3.2. 
145  Id. at art. 2.1. 
146  China Draft Model BIT, supra note 135, at art. 5.2. 
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Expropriation and Compensation 
 
A comparison of the 2003 Model BIT and the subsequent draft 
Model suggests increased caution on the part of China in preserving 
regulatory space, particularly in light of arbitral trends on indirect 
expropriation.  Whereas the 2003 Model included standard lan-
guage on expropriation, nationalization, or “other similar 
measures,” guaranteeing compensation, non-discrimination, due 
process and that expropriation could only be for the “public inter-
ests” (undefined),147 the subsequent draft Model specifically defines 
“non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety and the environment” as not amounting to an 
indirect expropriation.148  Here, China’s policy is much closer to the 
positions taken by India in its 2015 Draft Model BIT.149  The 2011 
China-Uzbekistan BIT reflects the draft model.  While Article 6.1 in-
cludes indirect expropriation, defined as “[m]easures the effects of 
which would be equivalent to expropriation or nationaization,” 
within the ambit of the treaty, Article 6.3 states that “[e]xcept in ex-
ceptional circumstances, such as the measures adopted severely sur-
passing the necessity of maintaining corresponding reasonable pub-
lic welfare, non-discriminatory regulatory measures  adopted  by  
one  Contracting  Party  for  the  purpose  of  legitimate  public  wel-
fare,  such  as public health, safety and environment, do not consti-
tute indirect expropriation.”150 
Compensation is calculated as “the fair market value of the ex-
propriated investment immediately before the expropriation oc-
curred.”151  The draft does not include mitigations of monetary 
awards such as those defined in the India Model BIT,152 nor does it 
                                                   
147  2003 China Model BIT, supra note 140, at art. 4.1. 
148  China Draft Model BIT, supra note 135, at art. 7.3. 
149  Indian Draft Model BIT, supra note 28, at art. 5.4 (“non-discriminatory 
regulatory actions by a party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate 
public welfare objectives such as public health, safety, and the environment shall 
not constitute expropriation). 
150  Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., arts. 6.1 & 6.3, Apr. 19, 2011, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3476 [https://perma.cc/69SB-
GHD9]. 
151  China Draft Model BIT, supra note 135, at art. 7.2(a). 
152  Indian Draft Model BIT, supra note 28, at art. 5.7 (describing various 
mitigating factors, including the current and past use of the investment, that reduce 
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specify how future profits or past expenses should be taken into ac-
count in the calculation of the fair market value.  The 2011 China-
Uzbekistan BIT illustrates such positions,153 as does the China-Can-
ada BIT.154 
 
3.2.3.  SADC 
Standard of Treatment 
 
The SADC Model BIT focuses mostly on post-establishment 
rights and obligations.  The only clause dealing with admission of 
foreign investors references domestic law as the applicable frame-
work.155  While such a provision appears to fully protect state regu-
latory autonomy, its inclusion in the treaty might allow investors to 
elevate a violation of domestic law by state authorities, normally 
only challengeable in domestic fora, to a treaty breach subject to 
remedies available under the treaty and customary international 
                                                   
compensatory damages). 
153  Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., art. 6.4, Apr. 19, 2011, http://investment-
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3357 [https://perma.cc/69SB-
GHD9] (“The compensation mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be equiv-
alent to the fair market value of the expropriated investments immediately before 
the expropriation is taken or the impending expropriation becomes public 
knowledge, whichever is earlier. The compensation shall also include interest at a 
reasonable commercial rate until the date of payment. The compensation shall be 
made without unreasonable delay, be effectively realizable and freely transfera-
ble.”). 
154  Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Can.-China, at art. 10, Sept. 9, 2012, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3476 [https://perma.cc/M83S-JQ2T] 
(“Covered investments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall not 
be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to measures having an effect equivalent 
to expropriation or nationalization in the territory of the other Contracting Party 
(hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”), except for a public purpose, under do-
mestic due procedures of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and against com-
pensation. Such compensation shall amount to the fair market value of the invest-
ment expropriated immediately before the expropriation, or before the impending 
expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is earlier, shall include interest 
at a normal commercial rate until the date of payment, and shall be effectively re-
alizable, freely transferable, and made without delay.”). 
155  SADC Model BIT, supra note 84, at art. 3 (“The State Parties shall pro-
mote and admit Investments in accordance with their applicable law, and shall ap-
ply such laws in good faith.”). 
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law.  The SADC Commentary also notes that including such a clause 
may hinder the host state’s ability to modify the conditions of ad-
missions (such as excluding sensitive sectors) subsequent to enter-
ing into a BIT.156  The overall recommendation, therefore, is not to 
include such a clause, and the language is only provided for illus-
trative purposes should a state choose to include some pre-estab-
lishment provision. 
Article 4 guarantees national treatment for post-establishment 
protection, but requires an assessment of a number of factors related 
to the nature and impact of the foreign investment which could re-
sult in the foreign investment not being comparable to a domestic 
investment and hence warranting a different treatment.157  In con-
trast, the Model omits MFN treatment. It also excludes the export of 
the Model BIT provisions to existing bilateral or regional trade or 
investment agreements.  Hence, more favorable treatment in other 
treaties cannot be imported under the Model BIT (classic MFN situ-
ation), nor can any advantage or concession from the Model BIT be 
exported to other treaties that might have an MFN clause.  Should a 
state still wish to include an MFN clause in its treaty, the SADC 
Drafting Committee still recommends excluding legal exports to 
other treaties as it does with respect to national treatment.158  This 
would essentially result in a one-way MFN clause, where investors 
under the Model BIT could benefit from advantages granted under 
other trade and investment agreements, but the parties to the latter 
would not be able to benefit from treatment granted under the 
Model BIT. 
Like India and China, the SADC Drafting Committee is wary of 
general “fair and equitable treatment” clauses.  In response to arbi-
tral awards that have expanded the concept, the recommendation is 
not to include such a clause and to prefer instead a “Fair Adminis-
trative Treatment” clause.159  This is an innovative approach that 
limits protections to due process guarantees in domestic administra-
tive, legislative, and judicial proceedings.  Should a country none-
theless choose to include a more traditional fair and equitable treat-
ment clause, the proposed drafting circumscribes such treatment in 
                                                   
156  Id. at 16 (noting that certain investment liberalization clauses may re-
strict a state’s ability to close or restrict entry into a sector once it has been opened 
to foreign investors). 
157  SADC Model BIT, supra note 84, at arts. 4.1 & 4.2. 
158  Id. at art. 4.1. 
159  Id. at art. 5, option 2. 
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reference to “customary international law on the treatment of al-
iens.”  This fairly traditional formulation160 leaves space for evolving 
interpretations of what norms might be–or become–part of custom-
ary law. 
 
Expropriation and Compensation 
 
Article 6 of the SADC Model BIT sets out the general framework 
for expropriation: 
“6.1.  A State Party shall not directly or indirectly nationalize 
or expropriate investments in its territory except: 
(a) in the public interest; 
(b) in accordance with due process of law; and 
(c) on payment of fair and adequate compensation within a 
reasonable period of time.”161 
The interpretation of “fair and adequate compensation,” how-
ever, is where opinions differ, with the Model BIT offering three op-
tions ranging from the “equitable balance between the public inter-
est and interest of those affected” taking into account all 
circumstances and context, to “fair market value of the expropriated 
investment immediately before the expropriation took place” with 
or without reference to the public interest and surrounding circum-
stances regarding the investment and the expropriation. 
A few terms and carve-outs are noteworthy.  First, the Model 
BIT states “Awards that are significantly burdensome on a Host 
State may be paid yearly over a three-year period.”162  Some govern-
ments from developing countries and practitioners working on their 
behalf caution, however, that overly onerous awards might simply 
not be paid, thereby shifting the burden on investors to try to over-
come sovereign immunity and seek attachment or seizure of state 
assets abroad.  Since this would likely be a futile endeavor, the threat 
of non-payment really acts as a message to arbitrators and investors 
alike that overly generous awards may amount to purely pyrrhic 
victories for investors.  Second, the Model BIT confirms state’s right 
                                                   
160  The wording may be traced to Neer v. Mexico, 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (General 
Claims Commission 1926). 
161  SADC Model BIT, supra note 84, at art. 6.  
162  Id at art. 6.4. 
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to issue compulsory licenses and other restrictions on intellectual 
property rights made in accordance with international law and the 
corollary that these would not be considered an expropriation.  
Third, Article 6.7 narrows the scope of indirect expropriation by ex-
cluding from its ambit “measure of a State Party that is designed and 
applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, 
such as public health, safety and the environment.”163 
Lastly, although the SADC Model BIT did not recommend in-
cluding an ISDS clause as a general matter, it does provide the right 
of investors affected by an expropriation to seek “review by a judi-
cial or other independent authority of that State Party of his/its case 
and the valuation of his/its investment in accordance with the prin-
ciples set out in this Article.”164  In other words, the preferred re-
course, according to SADC, is for investor to vindicate their rights 
in domestic courts or arbitration in the host country and that body 
would apply and interpret the BIT provisions. 
 
3.2.4.  Brazil 
 
Article 11 of the Brazil-Mozambique Treaty guarantees that for-
eign investors will be allowed to establish their investment and con-
duct business on terms no less favorable than those available to do-
mestic investors.165  Non-discrimination between domestic and 
foreign investors is also provided with respect to restitution, indem-
nification or compensation in the case of losses suffered as a result 
of exigent circumstances including war and uprising.166 
 
Standard of Treatment 
 
Brazilian CIFAs exclude fair and equitable treatment, full pro-
tection and security, and umbrella clauses, and also limit the scope 
of protection to national treatment and a most-favored nation pro-
vision.  The MFN clauses are carefully circumscribed.  Investors of 
one of the Parties will not be treated less favorably than other for-
                                                   
163  Id. at art. 6.7. 
164  Id. supra note 84, at art. 6.8. 
165  Id. at art. 11.   
166  Id. at art. 12.   
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eign investors with respect to conditions of establishment and con-
duct of business.  However, most-favored nation treatment does not 
include any benefit or preferential treatment that accrues to other 
investors under a free trade agreement, customs union or common 
market scheme, or double taxation treaty in force that may be en-
tered into by Brazil or Mozambique in the future.  The MFN clause 
is designed to avoid any ratcheting effect of present and future trea-
ties that might include more liberal concessions. 
 
Expropriation and Compensation 
 
The Brazilian agreements signed so far include commitments by 
State Parties to not nationalize or expropriate without adequate and 
effective compensation, which is defined as the fair market value of 
the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation, 
to be provided in a liquid and transferable payment method (Article 
9).167  The instruments referred to may in some cases include public 
bonds with practical limitations on liquidity and transfer that are 
required by Brazilian constitutional law.  Balance of payments con-
siderations may be taken into account under some agreements. 
Brazilian agreements limit the concept of expropriation to direct 
takings.  Early agreements did not explicitly exclude indirect expro-
priation (as the US Model BIT of 2012 does) but the omission of the 
term was taken to mean it was not covered.  Subsequently, in the 
Chilean agreement, a clause explicitly excluding indirect expropria-
tion was included. 
 
3.2.5.  South Africa 
The two main changes that will be brought about as a result of 
the 2015 Protection of Investment Act are i) the exclusion of the prin-
ciple of fair and equitable treatment (FET) as it was deemed to be 
too widely framed and subject to controversial interpretation; and 
ii) reformulation of investor protection from expropriation in line 
with provisions of the South African Constitution. 
Omitting any mention of FET does not, however, absolve South 
Africa of any obligation in this area.  International customary law on 
                                                   
167  Brazil Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNCTAD Investment Policy 
Hub, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA 
[https://perma.cc/J5AH-DM9B]. 
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minimum standards of treatment would still apply, as the Act rec-
ognizes in Clause 9.168  Moreover, since the content of customary law 
is shaped by state practice and opinio juris, it is possible that the for-
mulation of FET in bilateral and multilateral agreements and its in-
terpretation in arbitrations169 would now be considered to form part 
of customary law and thus still bind South Africa to a higher stand-
ard than the Act suggests.  South Africa’s active stance in terminat-
ing BITs and rejecting broad notions of FET could perhpas be cast as 
a persistent objection to such a development.  In practice, though, 
this may provide little solace to either investors or South Africa as a 
host country since the contours of minimum standards of treatment 
under customary law are in flux and the outcomes of litigation or 
arbitration on the issue are highly uncertain.170 
By contrast, Clause 10 on the “Legal protection of investment” 
guarantees that “[i]nvestors have the right to property in terms of 
Section 25 of the Constitution.”  The latter provides: 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of gen-
eral application— 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the 
time and manner of payment of which have either been 
agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a 
court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and  man-
                                                   
168  Clause 9 on “Physical security of property” assures that foreign in-
vestors and their investments will be provided the level of physical security “as 
may be generally provided to domestic investors in accordance with minimum 
standards of customary international law and subject to available resources and 
capacity.”  Protection of Investments Act 22 of 2015 §9 (S. Afr.).   
169  OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment 
Law 8-22 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2004/03, 2004).  
170  See generally IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 54-63 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press ed., 2008) (discussing the customary framework of the FET along with 
the international minimum standard that defines the rights states are obliged to 
extend to foreigners.).  
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ner  of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an eq-
uitable  balance between the public interest and the interests 
of those affected, having regard to all relevant circum-
stances, including- 
(a) the current use of the property; 
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(e) the market value of the property; 
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the prop-
erty; and 
(e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
(4) For the purposes of this section- 
(a) the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to 
land reform,  and to reforms to bring about equitable access 
to all South Africa’s natural resources; and 
(b) property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions 
which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable 
basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an  Act of Par-
liament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to compa-
rable  redress. 
(7) A person or community dispossessed  of property  after 
19 June  1913 as a  result of past  racially discriminatory  laws 
or  practices is entitled,  to  the  extent  provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equita-
ble redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from 
taking legislative and  other measures to achieve land, water 
and related reform, in order to redress the  results of past 
racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the 
provisions of this section is in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 36 (1). 
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(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in sub-
section (6).171 
The public interest standard is typical for expropriations and the 
requirement that the expropriation be carried out pursuant to a law 
of general application and provides some safeguards against dis-
criminatory targeting of foreign investors.  However, the standard 
for compensation is very flexible and does not reflect customary in-
ternational law.  As with FET, it may be that South Africa is in fact 
bound by a more stringent international obligation with respect to 
compensation for the expropriation or nationalization of foreign in-
vestments than is enshrined in its Constitution.  The issue then be-
comes how international customary law and treaty obligations in-
teract with the South African Constitution and legislation.  South 
Africa’s incorporation of international law in its domestic legal or-
der is bifurcated: Treaties appear to be incorporated in a dualist 
fashion whereas customary international law “is law in the Republic 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parlia-
ment.”172  Customary international law standards regarding mini-
mum standards of treatment, expropriation and compensation are 
therefore of direct application in South Africa, but subordinated to 
the Constitution and legislation.  However, Section 39, which ap-
plies to all the Bill of Rights provisions including those on expropri-
ation, provides that “a court, tribunal or forum – . . .(b) must con-
sider international law.”  Overall, then, the Protection of Investment 
Act and the South African Constitution make it very difficult to as-
certain how much and what kind of protection foreign investors and 
their investments would be awarded and how that compares with 
the treatment of their domestic counterparts. 
 
3.3.  Extending or Creating Carve-Outs and Exceptions 
 
This section analyzes the spectrum of positions taken by emerg-
ing countries, ranging from the familiar form of bilateral investment 
treaties (India, China and SADC), to alternative investment instru-
ments (Brazil) and domestic approaches (South Africa). 
 
                                                   
171  S. AFR. CONST., 1996, Chapter 2, Section 25.   
172  Id. at ch. 14, §232.   
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3.3.1.  India 
 
The 2016 India Model BIT lists topics that are excluded from the 
definition of indirect expropriation.  The list includes government 
procurement, subsidies, grants, taxation, and compulsory licenses of 
intellectual property.173  In addition, Article 32 on General Excep-
tions appears to be loosely inspired by Article XX of the GATT.  It 
states that “[n]othing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by a Party of measures of general applica-
bility applied on a non-discriminatory basis” deemed necessary to 
maintain public morals or public order, protect human, animal or 
plant life or health, conserve the environment and natural resources, 
protect cultural artifacts, or manage a Party’s financial system, in-
cluding exchange rate policies.174 
 
3.3.2.  China 
 
Chinese BITs recently entered into force offer a range of carve-
outs and exclusions.  Some carve-outs are designed to limit the 
rights of foreign investors under national treatment or MFN clauses.  
For instance, the China-Congo BIT, the China-Mali BIT and the 
China-Uzbekistan BIT exclude investors of one party from benefit-
ting from any advantage or privilege deriving from customs unions, 
free trade zones, international tax agreements and agreements facil-
itating cross-border trade with neighboring countries that may be 
signed by the other party.175  This provision would appear to cover 
                                                   
173  2016 India Model BIT, supra note 29, at art. 2.4. See supra Section II.B.1.   
174  Id. at art. 32.   
175  Accord de coopération entre le Gouvernement de la République du 
Congo et le Gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine sur la promotion 
et la protection des investissements, China-Congo, Mar. 20, 2015, art. 3(4); Accord 
sur la promotion et la protection réciproques des investissements entre le Gou-
vernement de la République du Mali et le Gouvernement de la République Popu-
laire de Chine, China-Mali, Feb. 12, 2009, art. 3(4); Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., Apr. 19, 
2011, art. 4.2; Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States 
and the Government of the People ́s Republic of China on the Promotion and Re-
ciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Mex., July 11, 2008, Art. 10; Accord entre 
le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République 
Populaire de Chine sur l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investisse-
ments, China-Fr., Nov. 26, 2007, art. 4.  See also Agreement Between the Government 
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export processing zones and the special status of territories such as 
Hong Kong.  Similarly, the China-Canada BIT excludes from the am-
bit of its MFN clause:  
 
(a) treatment by a Contracting Party pursuant to any existing or 
future bilateral or multilateral agreement: 
(i) establishing, strengthening or expanding a free trade area 
or customs union; or 
(ii) relating to aviation, fisheries, or maritime matters includ-
ing salvage; 
(b) treatment accorded under any bilateral or multilateral in-
ternational agreement in force prior to 1 January 1994.176 
Non-discriminatory treatment is also at times excluded with re-
spect to government procurement and subsidies, including govern-
ment-supported loans, guarantees and insurances, and grants.177  
Other clauses protect existing non-conforming measures and their 
future amendments or renewals.178 
The China-Canada BIT includes a GATT Article XX-type list of 
general exceptions, though limited to measures “(a) necessary to en-
sure compliance with laws and regulations. . ., (b) necessary to pro-
tect human, animal or plant life or health; or (c) relating to the con-
servation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
                                                   
of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Can.-China, Sept. 9, 2012, art. 14 [herein-
after Canada-China BIT] (regarding certain tax exclusions).   
176  Canada-China BIT, supra note 175, at art. 8(1). 
177  Id. at art. 8(5).   
178  Id. at art. 8(2).   
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domestic production or consumption.”179  Additionally, a pruden-
tial exception relating to financial markets180 most likely reflects 
Canada’s recent policy orientations with respect to BITs and an ex-
ception for measures relating to “cultural industries,” which caters 
to China’s state censorship and other forms of control over publica-
tions and broadcastings.181 
Several China BITs include a denial-of-benefits clause for invest-
ments that are only nominally held by an entity of the BIT signatory 
countries.182  This is a response to the forum-shopping trend 
                                                   
179  Id. at art. 33(2).   
Compare Id. with Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187; 33 I.L.M. 1153 [hereinafter GATT] 
Art. XX (“nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any [Member] of measures:   
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not incon-
sistent with the provisions  
of this Agreement,  [. . .]; 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour; 
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeo-
logical value; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective  in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption; 
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commod-
ity agreement [. . .] 
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure es-
sential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during peri-
ods when the domestic price of such materials is  held  below  the  world price as 
part of a governmental stabilization plan [. . .]; 
 (j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short 
supply [. . .].”). 
180  Canada-China BIT, supra note 175, at art. 33(3).  See also Canada-China 
BIT Art. 33(4) (concerning other restrictions to protect monetary and exchange rate 
policies); Canada-China BIT art. 33(6)(a) (regarding the confidentiality of customers 
of financial institutions).  But see Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-Colom., Nov. 22, 2008, art. 
13 (discussing the prudential measures in the financial sector).   
181  Canada-China BIT, supra note 175, at art. 33(1).   
182  Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., Apr. 19, 2011, art. 10(1)(c), (2); Canada-
China BIT, supra note 175, at art. 16.   
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amongst investors that look for the treaty offering them the most 
favorable terms and incorporating a shell corporation in a state 
party to that treaty in order to benefit from the BIT while really con-
trolling the investment from another country that might not have a 
BIT with the host country or might have a less favorable BIT. 
Alongside these varied and sophisticated clauses designed to 
preserve regulatory autonomy of the host state, some China BITs are 
rather bareboned.  For instance, the 2009 China-Malta BIT is tradi-
tional and unremarkable in its drafting.183  The 2009 China-Mali BIT 
is also fairly representative of traditional BITs, as are the 2008 China-
Mexico BIT and the 2007 China-France BIT.  Some provisions are in 
direct conflict with some more recent Chinese BITs, for instance 
those provisions regarding whether treaty provisions apply if dip-
lomatic relations between the signatory states are interrupted. 
The range of drafting of China BITs over the past ten years sup-
ports China’s claim that it tailors treaties to each particular negotia-
tion, and is amenable to using the model BIT of the other party if 
need be.  However, BITs signed around and after 2012 demonstrate 
much more detailed exceptions and safeguard clauses to protect reg-
ulation of the host state.  Still, there is little consistency across these 
newer BITs about what exceptions are included.  Overall, most of 
the exception and exclusion clauses reflect current debates about 
preserving policy space, in particular debates on subject matters 
such as public health, thwarting investor forum shopping strategies, 
and the effect of MFN clauses from other economic law agreements. 
 
3.3.3.  SADC 
 
The Model SADC BIT encourages states to create a schedule of 
non-conforming measures that might violate the non-discrimination 
provision and would be excluded from scrutiny under that clause.184  
Similarly, the Model BIT provides for the negotiation of a schedule 
of sectors or subsectors to be excluded from national treatment.  Na-
tional treatment would also be restricted to any investments pro-
tected under the BIT and would not be extended to other BITs or free 
trade agreements signed by the parties. 
                                                   
183  Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of Malta on the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, China-Malta, Feb. 22, 2009.   
184  Model SADC BIT, supra note 24, at art. 4.3.   
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The capital and profits repatriation clause includes a number of 
exclusions to the principle of the freedom of repatriation, mostly 
dealing with moneys connected to a public interest (taxes, public or 
other compulsory retirement schemes, money judgments, etc.).185  
Additionally, the host states reserve the right to enact restrictions on 
the movement of capital for balance of payment purposes and other 
macro-economic and exchange rate management difficulties 
(known as safeguard provisions).  This language may result from 
the lesson learned in the Argentinian crisis arbitrations, where Ar-
gentina relied on general non-preclusion measures clauses to defend 
its debt restructuration.  Under the SADC Model BIT, such a situa-
tion would be covered with more certainty by these safeguard pro-
visions. 
Lastly, Article 25 provides more general exceptions to non-dis-
crimination provisions and expropriation and compensation disci-
plines.  The exceptions to non-discrimination are somewhat remi-
niscent of GATT Article XX, inasmuch as they cover measures 
“(a) to protect public morals and safety; 
(b) to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources; and 
(d) to protect the environment.”186 
Measures the state considers necessary to maintain or protect in-
ternational peace and security or to protect its national security in-
terests are also exempted from treaty obligations.  It is noteworthy 
that the necessity standard is cast as a subjective one (under the 
Model SADC the state determines necessity), rather than the objec-
tive test that has been developed in WTO case law to interpret sev-
eral GATT Article XX clauses. 
 
3.3.4.  Brazil 
 
Brazilian CIFAs include a right to regulate national security, the 
environment, health, labor, and other areas.  They also allow re-
strictions on transfers of profits and other payments out of the host 
                                                   
185  Id. at art. 8.   
186  Id. at art. 25.   
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country in the case of crises or serious difficulty affecting the balance 
of payments.  Due process and non-discrimination safeguards re-
main in place should such restrictions be implemented.  These types 
of clauses are not out of the ordinary in BITs generally, but are also 
not a standard feature in all agreements.  Recent model BITs from 
emerging countries show a renewed interest in including such an 
exception.187 
 
3.3.5.  South Africa 
 
Although no provision of the Promotion of Investment Act is ex-
plicitly framed as an exception, Clause 12 on the “Right to regulate” 
creates a framework for safe-harboring government regulation from 
potential indirect expropriation claims or other challenges from in-
vestors.  The subject matters covered include, but are not limited to: 
(a) redressing historical, social and economic inequalities 
and injustices; 
(b) upholding the values and principles espoused in Section 
195 of the Constitution; 
(c)  upholding the rights guaranteed in the Constitution; 
                                                   
187  Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
Between the Republic of Colombia and (blank), August 2007, 
https://www.italaw.com/documents/inv_model_bit_colombia.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XGL8-NXSQ] (allowing restrictions on transfers for balance of 
payment purposes, as do the proposed Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty (a change from the earlier 2003 Model), and the SADC Model BIT.); 
2016 Indian Model BIT, art. 6.4, supra note 29; Model SADC BIT, supra note 24.  US 
treaties normally do not have such provisions:  a rare exception is found in the 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Democratic Socialist Republic 
of Sri Lanka.  Treaty Between the United States of America and the Democratic So-
cialist Republic of Sri Lanka Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protec-
tion of Investment, Sri Lanka-U.S., Sept. 20, 1991.  BITs signed by France often in-
clude such a provision.  See Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
of France and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Reciprocal Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments, Fr.-Mex, Nov. 12, 1998; Agreement Between 
the Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the 
Republic of France for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
Eth.-Fr., June 25, 2003; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
France and the Government of the Republic of Uganda on the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments, Fr.-Uganda, Jan. 3, 2003.  However, Australian BITs 
do not typically feature a balance of payments safeguard clause.   
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(d) promoting and preserving cultural heritage and prac-
tices, indigenous knowledge and biological resources related 
thereto, or national heritage; 
(e)  fostering economic development, industrialisation and 
beneficiation; 
(f) achieving the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights; or 
(g) protecting the environment and the conservation and 
sustainable use of natural resources.188 
Unlike the SADC Model, this list of carve-outs is not inspired by 
the GATT, but rather by the South African Constitution.  Clause 
11(2) resembles the more traditional non-preclusion measures 
clauses of bilateral investment treaties.189 
Emerging economies are now quite intentional and reflective in 
the negotiation and drafting of exceptions clauses in BITs.  Still, the 
range of drafting techniques and approaches reflects speaks to a 
global regulatory laboratory rather than the emergence of a new 
gold standard or even a range of best practices. 
 
3.4.  Investor and Home State Obligations 
 
Several new BITs from emerging countries include not only 
rights but also robust obligations for investors.  Beyond fairly obvi-
ous (and likely redundant) obligations to comply with the law of the 
host state, new investor obligations typically cover corporate gov-
ernance, anti-corruption and corporate social responsibility. 
 
3.4.1. India 
 
Perhaps the most innovative feature of the 2016 Indian Model 
                                                   
188  Promotion of Investment Act 22 of 2015 §12(1) (S. Afr.).   
189  See Id. at §12(2) (“The government or any organ of state may take 
measures that are necessary for the fulfilment of the Republic’s obligations in re-
gard to the maintenance, compliance or restoration of international peace and se-
curity, or the protection of the security interests, including the financial stability of 
the Republic.”). 
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BIT is Chapter III on investor obligations.  Such undertakings in-
clude anti-corruption obligations for the investors and their invest-
ments,190 general legal and administrative compliance and specific 
tax compliance with the law of the host state.191  Article 12 includes 
a best efforts obligation for investors to incorporate “internationally 
recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in their prac-
tices and internal policies. . . These principles may address issues 
such as labour, the environment, human rights, community rela-
tions and anti-corruption.”192  The draft Model included an addi-
tional best efforts provision obligating foreign investors to “strive, 
through their management policies and practices, to contribute to 
the development objectives of the Host State. In particular, Investors 
and their Investments should recognise the rights, traditions and 
customs of local communities and indigenous peoples of the Host 
State and carry out their operations with respect and regard for such 
rights, traditions and customs.”193 
While many of these obligations would previously have been 
part of domestic law, India’s strategy elevates them to treaty obliga-
tions.  This strategy may result in creating a defense for India not to 
give to investors or investments in breach of such obligations the 
protections of the treaty.  Hence, while investors are traditionally 
third-party beneficiaries to BITs, the 2016 Indian Model BIT also 
makes them third-party obligors in a much stronger sense than they 
might have been previously.  However, disputes regarding these 
provisions are excluded from investor-state dispute settlement.194  
Two possible processes could ensue for arbitral tribunals when In-
dia as a host state argues that the investor has breached its Chapter 
III obligations.  First, arbitrators could stay the arbitration pending 
resolution of the Chapter III breaches in domestic venues, and take 
judicial notice of any outcome in adjudicating any remaining Chap-
ter II claims brought by the investor.  Second, the arbitrators could 
dismiss the host state’s arguments for lack of jurisdiction, if Article 
13.2 is interpreted to strip them of jurisdiction on any Chapter III 
counterclaim, justifications or defense.  It is therefore uncertain 
whether India could claim that a breach of Chapter III obligations 
by the investor justifies its actions, or justifies a reduction in the 
                                                   
190  2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 29, at art. 11(ii). 
191  Id. at art. 11(iii).  
192  Id. at art. 12. 
193  2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 29, at art. 12.2. 
194  Id. at art. 13.2. 
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amount of compensation that might be awarded by the tribunal. 
 
3.4.2.  SADC 
 
The Model BIT devotes an entire Part 3 to the “Rights and Obli-
gations of Investors and State Parties.”  The main topics addressed 
therein cover anti-corruption measures, environmental protection, 
corporate governance, human rights and labor standards, and de-
velopment and investor liability. 
Investors would need to complete environment and social im-
pact assessments pre-establishment (Art. 13) meeting the most strin-
gent of either the host state, the home state or the International Fi-
nance Corporation.195  Article 15 on “Minimum Standards for 
Human Rights, Environment and Labour” uses a similar approach 
when it prohibits investors from managing or operating “invest-
ments in a manner inconsistent with international environmental, 
labour, and human rights obligations binding on the Host State or 
the Home State, whichever obligations are higher.”196  The reference 
to the most stringent regulatory framework of the home state, the 
host state or an international organization, is an original device to 
avoid regulatory races to the bottom and the exploitation of lower 
environmental and labor standards by investors.  At the same time, 
it could resolve the issue of investors puzzling whether to comply 
with home state laws with uncertain extraterritorial reach.197  Such 
an approach could be deployed beyond impact assessments to top-
ics including corruption, corporate governance (fiduciary duties 
and accounting), and data protection, for instance. 
Quite uniquely amongst the new wave of BITs and model BITs 
from developing countries, Article 21 on the “Right to Pursue De-
velopment Goals” reflects a number of debates that have unfolded 
in recent years about potential clashes between foreign investors’ 
                                                   
195  SADC Model BIT, supra note 24, at art. 13.  
196  Id. at art. 15.  
197  See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. 
Cir., 1993) (holding that presumption against application of statutes exterritorialy 
does not apply when the conduct occurs primarily in the United States); EEOC v. 
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (holding that Title VII does not apply 
American employers that employ American workers overseas); Saudi Arabia v. 
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (holding that detention by the Saudi Government was 
not “based upon a commercial activity” within the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act). 
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expectations and developmental state policies.198  This provision of 
the SADC Model BIT provides three main avenues for developmen-
tal objectives: 
The provision allows exceptions to non-discrimination 
clauses in order to implement regional development goals.  
The now defunct Article 8.2.b of the WTO’s Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures also allowed an ex-
ception to disciplines for subsidies meant to foster regional 
development.  The EU was and still is a major user of re-
gional subsidies to promote the economy of disadvantaged 
or vulnerable regions.  Developing countries are now seek-
ing to follow that path, too. 
The provision also allows the state to impose certain require-
ments designed to “support the development of local entre-
preneurs” and increase the local workforce capacity through 
requirements imposed on investors at the time of establish-
ment.  This provision is a response to the longstanding cri-
tique of the often limited benefits of foreign investment to 
assist the local workforce in moving up the corporate ladder 
and eventually help develop a more sophisticated local busi-
ness community, rather than merely use the local workforce 
as a source of cheap, low-qualified labor. 
Last, the provision enshrines the ability of the state to “take 
measures necessary to address historically based economic 
disparities suffered by identifiable ethnic or cultural groups 
due to discriminatory or oppressive measures against such 
groups prior to the signing of this Agreement.”199  This 
clause seems particularly tailored in response to post-apart-
heid reforms in South Africa and the investment arbitration 
challenges some of these policies have led to in recent years. 
 
3.4.3.  Brazil 
 
The new Brazilian agreements include a section on the responsi-
bility of investors.  Some versions are very detailed.  For example, 
                                                   
198  SADC Model BIT, supra note 24, at art. 21. 
199   Id. at art. 21. 
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the Brazil-Chile agreement200 states that the parties should encour-
age companies to follow policies of sustainability and corporate re-
sponsibility that will further the development of the host country 
and use best efforts to comply with the OECD Guidelines for Multi-
nationals, including respecting human rights; building local capac-
ity and developing human capital in the host country; following best 
practices in corporate governance; protecting whistleblowers; and 
other duties.  Although phrased only as best efforts commitments, 
these obligations could be taken into account in efforts at dispute 
settlements, including State-to-State arbitration. 
In conclusion, recent evolutions in the drafting of definitions, 
rights and obligations in BITs and other investment agreements in-
volving emerging countries reflect common trends towards a better 
control by the states of who and what assets may benefit from treaty 
protection.  Much of this may be interpreted as a reaction to expan-
sionary tendencies in arbitral interpretations. 
 
4.  PRESERVING DOMESTIC JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORMING 
INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION 
 
In some cases, the backlash against BITs does not focus on a par-
ticular developmental policy but rather on the perceived intrusion 
they create on the normal functioning of domestic institutions, in-
cluding the judiciary.  For instance, the vast number of BITs that In-
dia has entered into only garnered attention after a number of arbi-
tration proceedings found not only against Indian regulatory 
measures, but more specifically against decisions of the Indian judi-
ciary.201  A number of emerging countries are therefore exploring 
procedural rules to limit access to ISDS (A) and substantive rules 
regarding arbitrators’ competence to offer better guarantees of im-
partiality (B). 
 
                                                   
200   Chile CIFA, supra note 93.  
201  See Prabhash Ranjan & Deepak Raju, Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
the Indian Judiciary, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 809 (2014) (offering three ways to 
avoid these conflicts: exclude judicial actions from the ambit of treaty-based arbi-
trations, exclude judicial actions from the ambit of substantive treaty protections, 
or require exhaustion of local remedies). 
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4.1.  Limiting Access to Arbitration by Investors 
 
As discussed in Section I.B.3 above, “fork in the road provisions” 
giving investors the choice to use domestic legal remedies in the host 
state or ISDS have been a feature of BITs for some time. In practice, 
investors typically prefer ISDS.  Some BITs also have waiting peri-
ods after investors raise a grievance but before they can engage in 
litigation or arbitration, presumably to give the parties a chance to 
work out a settlement.  More drastically, requirements to exhaust 
local remedies create an even greater hurdle for investors to initiate 
arbitration proceedings.  Limiting arbitral jurisdictions to certain 
claims is another way to constrain the scope of international invest-
ment arbitration.  These steps, and other measures taken by devel-
oping countries, are illustrated below. 
 
4.1.1.  India Model BIT 
 
The long and detailed Chapter IV on disputes between investors 
and a state party reflects the government’s effort both to narrow the 
scope of ISDS claims as well as to improve its procedures. India’s 
reservations concerning ISDS are also clear from the fact that it is not 
a member of ICSID.  Nonetheless, India has been a respondent in 
some twenty investment arbitrations since 2003.  Nine of these set-
tled (all involved the financing of the Dabhol energy project in Ma-
harashtra), one was decided in favor of the investor and ten are 
pending.202  Indian investors were involved in three cases, one of 
which settled, one that had an unknown status and one that is pend-
ing.203  They held arbitrations at the PCA under the UNCITRAL 
rules204  with a single or three arbitrators, presumably ad hoc, under 
                                                   
202  India Country Case, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (Click “India”) [https://perma.cc/7BRR-T3HA]. 
203   Id. 
204  Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys Ltd v. Republic of India., PCA Case No. 
2015-40, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/682 [https://perma.cc/EL66-LR9R]; Louis Drey-
fus Armateurs SAS v. The Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2014-26,  UNCTAD 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/600 [https://perma.cc/PT3B-BNVX]; CC/Devas 
(Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Telcom Devas 
Mauritius Limited v. Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2013-09,  UNCTAD 
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UNCITRAL rules.205  The 2016 Model BIT allows arbitrations under 
the ICSID Convention “provided that both the Parties are full mem-
bers of the Convention” (which seems inapplicable since India is not 
a party) or the “Additional Facility Rules of ICSID “provided that 
                                                   
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/484 [https://perma.cc/4SCF-YSM3]; Tenoch 
Holdings Limited et al. v. The Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2013-23, UNCTAD 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/491 [https://perma.cc/B36E-THQA]. 
205  South Asia Entertainment Holdings Limited v. India, UNCTAD 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,   http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/735 [https://perma.cc/QX4Y-629S]; All Asia 
Networks v. India; Vedanta Resources plc v. India, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY 
HUB,  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/733 
[https://perma.cc/J6P3-3R77]; Cairn Energy PLC v. India,  PCA Case No. 2016-7, 
UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/691 [http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/691]; Vodafone International Holdings BV v. In-
dia, PCA Case No. 2016-35, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/581 [http://investment-
policyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/581]; Deutsche Telekom v. India, UNCTAD 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/550 [https://perma.cc/HL6X-N7QR]; Khaitan 
Holdings Mauritius Limited v. India, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/553 
[https://perma.cc/8WX2-CDFT]; White Industries Australia Limited v. The Re-
public of India, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/378 [https://perma.cc/T49P-S2SY]; ABN Amro 
N.V. v. Republic of India, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  http://investment-
policyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/149 [https://perma.cc/DS76-V5EV]; ANZEF 
Ltd. v. Republic of India,  UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  http://investment-
policyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/151 [https://perma.cc/TUT3-3JWU]; BNP 
Paribas v. Republic of India,  UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/147 [https://perma.cc/X5AP-F36Y]; 
Credit Lyonnais S.A. (now Calyon S.A.) v. Republic of India,  UNCTAD 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/148 [https://perma.cc/J654-VL5W]; Credit 
Suisse First Boston v. Republic of India,  UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/150  
[https://perma.cc/D3FE-S7TD]; Erste Bank Der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG 
v. Republic of India, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/141 [https://perma.cc/J4WW-J8KQ]; Offshore 
Power Production C.V., et al. v. Republic of India,  UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY 
HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/139 
[https://perma.cc/92VJ-PS6H]; Standard Chartered Bank v. Republic of India,  
UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB,  http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/152 [https://perma.cc/CZP7-TF88]; Bechtel En-
terprises Holdings, Inc. and GE Structured Finance (GESF) v. The Government of 
India, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/104 [https://perma.cc/X85K-3QBE].  
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either Party. . .is a member of the ICSID Convention.”206 
The restrictive nature of ISDS under the 2016 Indian Model BIT 
comes from the interaction of two features: exhaustion of domestic 
remedies and immunity of domestic court decisions.  On the one 
hand, the Model requires that investors must exhaust remedies 
available under domestic law that cover  “the same measure or sim-
ilar factual matters for which a breach of [the] Treaty is claimed”207 
for at least five years from the date when the investor first knew of 
the measure208 before proceeding with investor-state arbitration un-
der the BIT.  However, if no domestic recourse exists or no resolu-
tion was reached within the five-year period, investors may proceed 
to arbitration,209 subject to another six-month negotiation period,210 
but only if less than six years have elapsed since the investor first 
knew or should have known of the measure.211  On the other hand, 
the Model BIT states that arbitration tribunals lack the jurisdiction 
to “review the merits of a decision made by a judicial authority of 
the Parties.”212  In practice, then, it appears that investors must first 
vindicate their grievances in Indian courts; if they win, they will not 
need ISDS. If they lose, they will be precluded from resorting to ISDS 
on those same issues because the tribunal cannot take up an issue 
once decided by a court.  In any case, investors have a six-months 
window, to make a claim, after five years and six months have 
elapsed but before six years after they first knew or should have 
known of the measure.  Referring to similar requirements in the 
draft Model BIT, the Law Commission of India commented: 
This provision renders the entire BIT unworkable. . .Pursu-
ing domestic remedies would entail an interaction with the 
judicial authorities of the Host State, which would result 
in . . .decisions on the merits.  However. . .any finding by a 
local Court [acts] as a jurisdictional bar in as so far as the Ar-
bitral Tribunal is concerned. It is hard to contemplate too 
many scenarios where an investor would comply with the 
provision for exhaustion of local remedies and yet overcome 
                                                   
206  2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 29, at art. 16.1. 
207  Id. at art. 15.1. 
208  Id. at art. 15.2. 
209  Id. at art. 15.2. 
210  Id. at art. 15.4. 
211  Id. at art. 15.5 (i). 
212  Id. at art. 13.5. 
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the jurisdictional bar imposed by Article 14.2(2).213 
 
4.1.2.  China 
 
BITs involving China at times include procedural and substan-
tive limitations or pre-requisites to investor-state arbitration but no 
systematic drafting strategy transpires from a review of recently ne-
gotiated BITs.  A number of recent BITs include a “cooling off” pe-
riod of six months since the events giving rise to the claim before the 
investor may submit an arbitral claim.214  Moreover, a notice period 
to the contracting party may be required declaring the investor’s in-
tent to file for a claim, and it is unclear whether it runs concurrently 
with the cooling off period (see, e.g., four-month notice period and 
six-month since the events giving rise to the claim in the China-Can-
ada BIT). 
With respect to forum, China signed on to ICSID in 1990 and 
ratified it in 1993 but restricted ICSID tribunals’ jurisdiction to 
claims regarding compensation for expropriation.  Moreover, not all 
BITS signed by China after its ICSID ratification refer to ICSID juris-
diction, which some commentators interpret as a continued reluc-
tance from China to embrace ICSID proceedings.215 
Some BITs provide for an exhaustion of certain local remedies.  
For instance, the China-Malta BIT requires investors to go through 
“the administrative review procedures according to the laws of the 
                                                   
213  Analysis of the 2015 Draft Model Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
Report No. 260, Law Commission of India, available at http://lawcommissiono-
findia.nic.in/reports/Report260.pdf [https://perma.cc/55P6-DPSW]. The Com-
mission accepts the provision that bars the Arbitral Tribunal from reviewing the 
merits of a judicial decision but believes Tribunals should be able to determine if 
such a decision, taken as a final and irreversible government act, violates some pro-
vision of the treaty. The jurisdictional bar could make this impossible. The US Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers argues that these provisions foreclose “any 
ISDS cases in areas that might be covered by judicial action, including the very im-
portant area of intellectual property protection.”  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
MANUFACTURERS, COMMENTS ON DRAFT INDIAN MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATY, 7 (2015) http://www.nam.org/Issues/Trade/ISDS/NAM-Comments-on-
Draft-India-Model-Bilateral-Investment-Treaty-Joint-US-EU-Business.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/545V-WN68] 
214  See e.g., Canada-China BIT, supra note 175, at art. 21.2(b) (“at least six 
months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim.”). 
215  NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES – 
POLICIES AND PRACTICE 39 (2009).  
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[PRC]” prior to submitting an arbitration claim.  Similarly, Malta re-
quires Chinese investors to exhaust local judicial or arbitral re-
courses prior to undertaking international investor-state arbitra-
tion.216  While the language may be straightforward, navigating the 
requirements in practice may be much more complicated since it re-
quires research and interpretation of the local law regarding which 
local administrative or judicial proceedings are required in each le-
gal system. This may be all the more so the case for China, where 
local, regional and central administrations amounts to as many lay-
ers of potential administrative proceedings. 
Substantive restrictions typically either exclude certain sectors 
from arbitration or seek to protect the host state’s prudential and 
regulatory authority.  For instance, the China-Canada BIT provides 
that a contracting party may respond to an arbitral claim by invok-
ing Article 33(3), which in turn may trigger a state-to-state arbitra-
tion between the BIT signatories.  The investor-state proceedings are 
stayed while the state-to-state claim is adjudicated.217  Article 33(3) 
states: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining reasonable 
measures for prudential reasons, such as: 
(a) the protection of depositors, financial market participants 
and investors, policy-holders, policy-claimants, or persons 
to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial institution; 
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or fi-
nancial responsibility of financial institutions; and 
(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a Contracting 
Party’s financial system.218 
It may be that Canada was the party advocating for such a pro-
vision, though the treaty was signed in 2012, when the 2008 financial 
crisis would still have been very much at the forefront of regulators’ 
priorities.  Argentina’s financial and economic crisis of the early 
2000s, and the ensuing string of arbitrations that revealed the very 
                                                   
216  Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of Malta on the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, China-Malta, art. 9, Feb. 22, 2009, http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3368 [https://perma.cc/C25H-SMZU].  
217  Canada-China BIT, supra note 175, at arts. 20.2(a), 33(3). 
218  Id. at art. 33(3). 
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limited safeguards to protect prudential measures may also have 
been a motivation behind Article 33. 
By contrast, some Chinese BITs are mostly free of procedural or 
substantive limitations to arbitration.219  Ultimately, how much of a 
recourse an investor-initiated arbitration against China would be is 
questionable.  Relationships with government officials may be more 
critical to the redress of grievances.  A breakdown in such relation-
ships, by contrast, means that even if arbitration leads to a victory 
for the investor, it may be a hollow one.  Conversely, outwards in-
vestments where Chinese investors seek arbitration against a host 
state may play out differently depending whether the investor has 
the support of the Chinese government. 
 
4.2.  Moving Away from the pro-Investor Bias 
 
Investor-state arbitration has fallen prey to increasingly vocal 
critiques regarding bias in favor of investors due to shortcomings in 
the vetting mechanism for arbitrators, procedures for arbitration 
and a culture of skepticism regarding the legitimacy of states’ regu-
latory measures when they adversely affect foreign investments.  
These concerns have taken on all the more visibility with the Euro-
pean Union advocating for a permanent international investment 
court in lieu of ISDS.220  The topic is therefore no longer solely a sore 
point for emerging countries but a shared issue for many developed 
and developing countries alike.  This section reflects on some pro-
posals from emerging countries to improve the legitimacy of inves-
tor-state dispute resolution. 
                                                   
219  See e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., art. 12, Apr. 19, 2011, http://investmentpol-
icyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3357 [https://perma.cc/X5S3-2E9Z] 
(requiring only a 6-month negotiation period for certain claims). 
220  See e.g., European Commission Press Release MEMO/16/4350, EU-
Canada Trade and Investment Negotiations, Dec. 13, 2016 http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm [https://perma.cc/GK9P-
ECDV] (“The European Commission and the Canadian Government are working 
together to establish a multilateral investment court”); European Commission Press 
Release IP/15/5651, TTIP Negotiations with the UN, Sept. 19, 2015, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LE4U-E72F] (“The European Commission has approved its pro-
posal for a new and transparent system for resolving disputes between investors 
and states – the Investment Court System”).  
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4.2.1.  India 
 
The 2016 India Model BIT includes detailed sections on qualifi-
cations and on selection of arbitrators and transparency of proce-
dures.  Article 18.1 lists the fields of expertise acceptable for arbitra-
tors.221  Articles 18.1 and 19 specifies how the arbitrators and the 
parties should deal with arbitrators’ potential conflicts of inter-
ests.222  Despite their length, the provisions still leave much to inter-
pretation and to the appreciation of the parties and the arbitrators 
alike.  Article 19.10 does list specific circumstances in which a “jus-
tifiable doubt as to an arbitrator’s independence or impartiality or 
freedom from conflicts of interests shall be deemed to exist.”223  Ad-
ditionally, other unlisted events or circumstances may also give rise 
to a “justifiable doubt” regarding an arbitrator’s suitability.  Most 
have to do with arbitrator’s connections with the parties or their at-
torneys, for instance if the arbitrator is in the same law firm as one 
of the counsels.  Arbitrators are required to disclose in writing any 
potential conflict of interest224 and the existence of such circum-
stances are grounds for a challenge by a party to the dispute.225 
The 2016 Model BIT also includes provisions on the dismissal of 
“frivolous claims” defined as “a claim submitted by the investor 
[. . .]:  (a) not within the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, or (b) 
manifestly without legal merit or unfounded as a matter of law.”226  
Meritless suits brought by investors primarily to put pressure on 
host states have been a recurrent concern of developing host coun-
tries, particularly because of the limited resources they have at their 
disposal to defend claims. 
In response to another critique often leveled at the ISDS system, 
the Model BIT includes a transparency provision,227 which creates a 
presumption that key legal documents relating to investor state ar-
bitrations will be made publicly available, including the notice of 
arbitration, written submissions by the parties, transcript of the 
                                                   
221  2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 29 at art. 18.1. 
222  Id. at arts. 18.1. and 19.  
223  Id. at art. 19.10. 
224  Id. at art. 19.2. 
225  Id. at art. 19.3. 
226  Id. at art. 21.1. 
227  Id. at art. 22. 
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hearings and awards of the tribunal.  This constitutes a radical de-
parture from the traditional ISDS framework. 
 
4.2.2.  SADC 
 
A recurring critique of traditional investor state dispute settle-
ment models is that only the investor has the ability to trigger arbi-
tration procedures.  Arguably, a host state could contract with the 
investor for a reciprocal arbitration clause in any contract made be-
tween the state and the investor (such as concession contracts), or 
simply use its domestic courts in any disputes with the foreign in-
vestor.  The problem with the latter is that investors increasingly 
tend to challenge domestic court decisions in BIT arbitrations, at 
times frustrating the finality of domestic court judgments.  BITs and 
Model BITs from developing countries offer a variety of responses 
to this phenomenon. 
The SADC Model BIT explicitly affirms the right of host state to 
present counterclaims in arbitrations initiated by foreign inves-
tors.228  In addition, host state may initiate domestic proceedings 
against the investor in its home state, under the domestic law of that 
home state.229  Such an avenue dovetails with other provisions in the 
SADC Model BIT on environmental impact assessment, and labor 
and human rights standards which are to be taken from the host or 
home state (or an international organization), whichever is the most 
stringent.  Moreover, it avoids the issue of foreign judgment recog-
nition if the host state was to win its case in its domestic courts but 
sought to enforce the judgment in the home state, presumably be-
cause the investor has assets there.  Along the same lines, the ability 
to sue directly in the investor’s home state makes recovery against 
the investor’s local assets much more likely, as domestic attachment 
measures to prevent assets from fleeing the jurisdiction are much 
easier to obtain than so-called Mareva injunctions230 to prevent the 
                                                   
228  SADC Model BIT at art. 19. 
229  Id. at art. 19.4. 
230  Worldwide Mareva injunctions refer to the freezing of assets outside 
of the court’s jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Obégi v. Kilani, 2011 ONSC 1636 (Can.) (dis-
cussing whether the court could assume jurisdiction on the matter regarding the 
freezing of assets in Ontario).  See generally David Capper, Worldwide Mareva Injunc-
tions, 54 MODERN L. REV. 329 (1991) (examining worldwide Mareva injunction cases 
and obstacles posed to asset freezing). 
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transfer of assets located in another jurisdiction.  Despite the many 
potential benefits of Article 19.4, a number of hurdles may frustrate 
its purpose.  First, the home state domestic law might not provide 
standing for the host state to sue.  Second, the host state, by initiating 
proceedings, would be relinquishing its sovereign immunity and 
may expose itself to counterclaims from the investor.  Third, the 
trend of “reverse incorporations” for tax shielding purposes may 
make it difficult to identify the home state of an investor, or may 
result in the home state not having any assets of the investors, if it 
used merely as a nominal incorporation location. 
 
4.2.3.  UNASUR 
 
As mentioned earlier, UNASUR countries have declared their 
opposition to ICSID as a forum and some members have sought to 
develop an alternative arbitral forum in Latin America.  More radi-
cally, the “Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America” 
(ALBA) strongly opposes the traditional ISDS system.  Principle 16 
of the Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty (TCP) 
provides “[t]he exigency that foreign investment respects national 
laws.  Unlike FTAs which impose a series of advantages and guar-
antees in favour of transnational companies, the TCP looks for a for-
eign investment that it respects the laws, reinvest the utilities and 
solves any controversy with the State like any national investor.”231  
Bolivia and Ecuador, two member countries of ALBA and TCP now 
have constitutional provisions prohibiting the respective govern-
ments from entering into treaties where the domestic judiciary 
would be displaced by international arbitration.232 
 
                                                   
231  Fundamental Principles Of The Peoples’ Trade Treaty, BOLIVARIAN 
ALLIANCE FOR THE PEOPLES OF OUR AMERICA [ALBA], http://alba-tcp.org/en/con-
tenido/governing-principles-tcp [https://perma.cc/MV4B-9BKX].  
232  CONSTITUCIÓN DE ECUADOR, Sept. 2008, art. 422 (Ecuador); REPÚBLICA 
DE BOLIVIA – CONSTITUCIÓN DE 2009, Feb. 7, 2009, art. 366 (Bol.). See also 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN LATIN AMERICA / DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE 
LAS LAS INVERSIONES EN AMÉRICA LATINA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS / PROBLEMAS Y 
PERSPECTIVAS, 180-81 Attila Tanzi et al. (eds., 2016) (“It may be noted that both Bo-
livia and Ecuador have recently amended their own constitutions in the sense of 
banning international arbitration.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
432 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
5.  CONCLUSION:  LESSONS FROM EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
There is no single strategy for investment governance in  emerg-
ing countries. Positions seem to range from China’s embrace of the 
BITs system, at least as far as its outbound investments are con-
cerned, to ALBA’s categorical and vitriolic rejection of BITs.  The de-
bates over international investment law are on-going and the system 
is in flux.  Emerging economies have sent a signal that they are no 
longer willing to accept the system as it emerged twenty years ago.  
The impact of this message in ongoing bilateral, regional and multi-
lateral negotiations remains an open question. 
The debate over BITs goes beyond technical legal issues.  Differ-
ent views of development strategy and the role of FDI in a successful 
development model are at stake.  At one end of the spectrum are 
those who want to create a fully integrated global economic space in 
which capital, unfettered by regulation, will seek its highest and best 
use.  From this point of view, it makes sense to keep foreign invest-
ment free of as many restrictions as possible.  There is no tradeoff 
between promoting investment on the one hand, and regulation in 
the name of development strategy on the other.  From this view-
point, most restrictions are economically inefficient and the best 
strategy is to allow unfettered FDI.  At the other end are those, like 
ALBA, that see FDI as part of an imperialist project that will under-
mine inclusive development and should be limited to the extent pos-
sible. 
The approach in most emerging economies lies between these 
two poles.  In what we might consider the consensus view, FDI is 
neither good nor bad, a priori.  Everything depends on the nature of 
the investment and the rules that govern it.  Host countries want to 
maintain their ability to regulate investments so they conform to de-
velopment priorities.  That leads to the demand for policy autonomy 
and for an increased space for domestic debate regarding the artic-
ulation of socio-economic development strategies and investment 
policy.  It is fair to say that all countries insist on greater protection 
for policy space.  Countries, like India and China, that accept ISDS 
preserve regulatory capacity by carving out exceptions and spelling 
them out with great specificity.  The Brazil CIFAs reaffirm “legisla-
tive autonomy and space for public policies” but do not contain spe-
cific carve-outs.  It would seem that Brazil expects to handle that 
more by ensuring that it can maintain control of any dispute settle-
ment process than by specific language. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/2
  
2017] Legal Innovation in Investment Law 433 
Recent developments suggest that resistance by emerging econ-
omies, as well as concerns of developed countries who are them-
selves facing ISDS claims by investors (including investors from 
emerging countries), may lead to major changes in the BITs regime.  
In a recent report, UNCTAD proposed an Investment Policy Frame-
work for Sustainable Development listing eleven core principles for 
investment policymaking for sustainable development.233  The re-
port recommends incorporating concrete commitments to promote 
and facilitate investment for sustainable development:  requiring in-
vestors to comply with investment-related domestic laws of the host 
state, including regulation regarding environmental cleanup; for-
mulating a fair and equitable treatment clause as an exhaustive list 
of state obligations; limiting full protection and security provisions 
to physical security and protection only and; including carefully 
crafted exceptions to protect human rights, health, core labor stand-
ards and the environment.234 
Similar ideas are being put forth in the context of the debates 
over the mega-regionals.  The United States agreed to public health 
exceptions in the draft for ISDS in the TPP before withdrawing from 
the project.  The EU made a number of suggestions for the ISDS sec-
tion of the proposed TTIP, now also shelved by the United States.  
For example, the EU sought to restrict the concept of fair and equi-
table treatment to exclude the “legitimate expectations” standard.  
The EU also wanted to ensure that the concept of full protection and 
security was limited to physical protection and security, not the pro-
tection of intangibles such as intellectual property.  Finally, the EU 
proposed a court-like system to replace private arbitration and cre-
ate greater certainly concerning prevailing norms.  To some extent, 
these proposals are congruent with some of the concerns from 
emerging countries.  While the TTIP appears to be either dead or in 
cold storage, and the TPP (minus the United States) is in flux, an-
other mega-regional agreement is emerging in Asia that may be-
come the next arena for the construction of international investment 
law.  The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 
led by China and involving the ten ASEAN members, Australia 
China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand,235 will include 
                                                   
233  WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF 
INVESTMENT POLICIES 107 (UNCTAD, ed. 2012). 
234  Id. at 135-141. 
235  See generally, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, 
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an investment chapter.  While negotiations are still ongoing, drafts 
of the investment chapter that have emerged so far suggest that 
some of the innovations being pushed by emerging economies are 
on the agenda and may end up in the final version of the agreement.  
Proposals reportedly have been put forward to include ISDS but de-
tails are not available and a final decision on this section has not 
been reached.236  One observer, noting that China has accepted ISDS 
in numerous BITs, believes that RCEP will include ISDS of some 
type.237  Finally, even if any of these mega-regional agreements fail 
to come about, bilateral negotiations will likely be infused by the 
range of concerns and drafting experimentation of the past decade. 
 
                                                   
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Pages/regional-comprehensive-eco-
nomic-partnership.aspx [https://perma.cc/3ZBW-7EE4] (Description of the RCEP 
including interest, benefits, and relevant news).  
236  A 2015 leaked draft chapter on investment does not mention ISDS. 
RCEP Draft Investment Text India (based on Draft investment Text October 2015), 
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/rcep-draft-investment-text-india.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9W89-W7E5]. 
237  Id.; Heng Wang, The RCEP and its Investment Rules: Learning from Past 
Chinese FTAs, 3 CHINESE J. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 2 (2017). 
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